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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the potential contribution of religious education to 
preventing Islamic extremism in Albania, Britain, France, and the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The existence of large Muslim populations in each of 
these four countries, combined with the fact that a growing number of young Muslims 
have become members of terrorist networks, constitutes a security threat to the whole 
Western world. In recent years, several terrorist incidents have taken place in all four of 
these countries. Governments tend to deal with terrorism by adopting counter-terrorism 
policies, which necessitate the use of force. This thesis suggests that religious education, 
if properly formulated as a preventive measure, may counter Islamic extremism 
effectively.  European institutions, such as the European Union, the Council of Europe, 
and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, have provided a 
substantial legal framework and general principles on how to establish a constructive and 
socially beneficial religious education curriculum. If Albania, Britain, France, and 
FYROM take into account the recommendations provided by these European institutions 
and implement them along with other positive innovative measures, they may set up an 
efficient mechanism to prevent Islamic radicalization. 
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At present more than 23 million Muslims are resident in Europe. This number is 
equivalent to nearly five percent of the total population.1 Moreover, a growing number of 
young Muslims become members of terrorist networks, which constitute a security threat 
to the whole Western world.2 This thesis investigates the extent to which religious 
education, when it is part of the religious accommodation that is provided to Muslims by 
European governments, can contribute to the prevention of Islamic radicalization. The 
case studies examined in this thesis are Albania, Britain, France, and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The study variable, namely religious 
education policies, presents significant differences among them. These cases are 
examined in order to investigate the extent to which educational measures can provide 
effective methods to counter radicalization and recruitment to terrorist organizations. 
A. IMPORTANCE  
In the years since the attacks of 11 September 2001, Islamic terrorism has 
emerged as an important security threat not only to the United States but to other 
countries worldwide. Terrorist incidents such as the 11 March 2004 train bombings in 
Madrid, the 2 November 2004 assassination of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 
Amsterdam, and the 7 July 2005 public transport bombings in London indicate that 
several European countries are among those for which terrorism is a fundamental threat. 
Islamic terrorism has both a global dimension, represented by transnational organizations 
such as Al Qaeda, and a local dimension represented by domestic terrorist groups of 
freshly radicalized Muslim citizens or residents. Even though these two threats are related 
to each other (and Al Qaeda remains a serious threat for European states), it seems that 
local groups acting autonomously have become a more immediate danger. 
                                                 
1 Timothy M. Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,” The Washington 
Quarterly (Summer 2004), 26. 
2 Petter Nesser, Jihad in Europe: Recruitment for terrorist cells in Europe, Norwegian Defence 
Research Establishment (FFI), 2006, found at: <http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00078/Recruitment-
for-terr_78247a.pdf>, 3. 
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As a result, in recent years counterterrorism has emerged as a sector of security 
policy of great importance. Some experts make a distinction between active and passive 
measures as means of countering terrorism. Active measures are intended to eliminate a 
group’s potential to organize and commit violent actions, and they necessitate the use of 
force. On the other hand, passive measures aim at weakening a group’s motivation to 
employ terrorism in the first place and they rely on peaceful strategies. Until now, 
endangered states have mainly employed active measures, which tend to provide 
temporary rather than long-term solutions to the problem. Coercive measures against Al 
Qaeda have restricted its operational capabilities but the organization is still alive and 
recovering. This suggests that active measures alone are not sufficient to counter the 
problem as a whole. Decision-makers should apply both active and passive measures in 
order to deal with Islamic terrorism effectively. If religious education is properly 
formulated, it can help young people understand and respect different beliefs, practices, 
races and cultures. If well-formulated religious education is provided by European 
governments to Muslims, as well as to young people of other faiths, it may help to 
prevent Islamic radicalization and thus diminish the danger of terrorism. 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that religious education can be an effective 
tool in the passive counterterrorism strategies pursued by the European governments 
under examination. The hypothesis raises several questions: 
• How is Islamic radicalization related to the religious education of 
Muslims?  
• What are the current policies of the governments under examination with 
respect to the religious education of Muslims? 
• What new policies, if any, might be usefully considered for adoption by 
these governments regarding the religious education of Muslims? 
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C. CATEGORIES OF POTENTIAL RECRUITS TO EXTREMISM 
Today, Muslims constitute the vast majority of immigrants in Europe, as a result 
of post-World War II guest-worker programs. People from less developed countries were 
invited to perform the jobs for which Europeans were not available. In recent years, 
however, radical Islam has spread among some Muslims, and this has contributed to the 
rise of terrorism in Europe. This raises the question: which Muslims are susceptible to 
recruitment in terrorist groups? 
As noted previously, Muslims comprise nearly five percent of Europe’s 
population and the rate of growth is accelerating because of immigration, conversions to 
the Islamic religion, and high fertility rates.3 These reasons suggest that there are three 
categories of people who may be candidates for recruitment:  first, immigrants who still 
maintain close links with their countries of origin; second, the converts who find in Islam 
a way to protest against perceived humiliations and affronts; and, third, young second- or 
third-generation Muslim residents, who feel discriminated against in European societies 
that do not fully accept them. Many experts judge that radical Islam attracts recruits 
mainly from the third category. If this assessment is correct, providing proper religious 
education to Muslims may diminish the risks of Islamic extremism.  
1. The “Outsiders” 
The first category of people who could be recruited, according to Robert Leiken’s 
typology, might be called “outsiders.” The outsiders are first generation immigrants who 
may be seeking asylum in a Western European country because the political situation is 
at a critical juncture back in their homeland. They may also be students at European 
universities, illegal immigrants, or just sojourners.4 Many Muslim immigrants to Europe 
come face-to-face with a civilization differentiated from theirs by history, language, 
culture, tradition and religion. They also have little understanding of the conditions facing 
                                                 
3 Timothy M. Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,” The Washington 
Quarterly (Summer 2004), 26. 
4 Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Immigration Problem, and Ours,” Mediterranean Quarterly (Fall 2004), 
205.   
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Europe’s many Muslim communities. This makes them experience confusion and 
sometimes leads them to social isolation and an identity crisis. However, only a few are 
overwhelmed by the sudden change in their lives.5 
What seems to be most noteworthy in this category of people is their capacity to 
recruit rather than their susceptibility to recruitment. This is because radical imams are 
classified in this category. In the United Kingdom, imams come from the same general 
sources of Muslim immigration, namely, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. 
They also do not speak English or have any knowledge of British society.6 Certain 
imams, experts report, either participate actively in the process of recruitment or open 
their mosques to terrorist recruiters while they serve as messengers or spiritual fathers to 
jihadist networks. 
According to the historical tradition of Islam, Muslim religious leaders living in a 
non-Muslim world are obliged to proselytize for Islam in conformity with the hijra 
doctrine. The hijra is perhaps the most important event in Islamic history. It was the 
migration of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers in 622 A.D. from Mecca to 
Medina, where they founded the first Islamic state. In Medina Muhammad established the 
theoretical principles of Islam and put them into practice for the first time. From this 
transition from Mecca to Medina stems the hijra doctrine, which has been used 
subsequently by Islamic movements to describe a transformation, a new development, 
and a new beginning. Accordingly, the process of migrating and establishing a Muslim 
community in a non-Muslim area can be described as a hijra.  
Muslims hold that any space gained for Islam is sacred and should belong to a 
community with a purely Muslim identity.7 Therefore all non-believers should be 
proselytized in order to bring them into this community. When addressing non-believers, 
Muslim clerics usually rely on a discourse different from the one they use when 
                                                 
5 Michael Taarnby, “Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe. Trends and Perspectives,” Centre of 
Cultural Research, University of Aarhus (January 2005), 32. 
6 Ibid., 32. 
7 Jabal Buaben, “What makes a Good City? A Muslim Perspective,” found in Web site at: 
<http://www.faithsforthecity.org.uk/Papers/Islam.pdf>. 
 5
addressing Muslims. This approach obscures their efforts to radicalize and at the same 
time makes it difficult for inquiring experts or journalists to gather information about 
their activities. European governments have exhibited a tolerant attitude toward the 
proselytizing methods of Muslims. This tolerance and the indifference of most of the 
public have made the efforts of Islamic recruiters of potential terrorists even more 
systematic. A well-known example of a mosque with a history of radicalization and 
recruitment for jihad is the one located in Finsbury Park in London. Its leader since 1996, 
Abu Hamza Al-Masri, has been distributing Islamist propaganda as a means for 
radicalization. He has sold visual material with graphic combat scenes and has been an 
agent of sending young Muslims to jihadist training camps.8 
2. The “Converts” 
The second category of people who may be susceptible to recruitment, the 
converts, may in some cases be victims of societal marginalization. Disaffected and 
troubled young people sometimes see the current wave of Islamic terrorism as a fight 
against injustice, infidelity, power and money. However, there is no single profile that 
characterizes individuals of this category. Although no official statistics about converts 
participating in terrorist actions appear to be available, the results of a Nixon Institute 
survey deserve consideration. According to this survey, “out of 279 suspected and 
convicted terrorists who resided in or transited through North America and Western 
Europe between the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and December 2003, 
about 86 percent were Muslim immigrants, the remainder being mainly converts (eight 
percent) and African American Muslims.”9  
Some experts hold that converts who eventually take up jihad are not motivated 
by theology but rather by a search for a purpose and an identity. According to Olivier 
Roy, “To convert to Islam today is a way for a European rebel to find a cause.” Roy 
suggests that such people twenty years ago would have embraced a radical leftist 
                                                 
8 Jabal Buaben, “What makes a Good City? A Muslim Perspective,” found in Web site at: 
<http://www.faithsforthecity.org.uk/Papers/Islam.pdf>. 
9 Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Immigration Problem, and Ours,” Mediterranean Quarterly (Fall 2004), 
206.   
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movement, but today are attracted to Islamism as a vehicle for fighting the system.10 In 
some cases, their choice is closely connected with the Iraq conflict, which they perceive 
as a Western plot to control oil resources in the Middle East. In addition to influencing 
the sentiments of European Muslims because of the perceived repression of Muslim 
populations, the Iraq war evoked anti-Western sentiments among Europeans who 
considered it an unjustified war, and this may have contributed to their conversion to 
Islam.  
From a sociological perspective, these individuals do not possess the cultural or 
religious background to resist radical interpretations of Islam, so they are much more 
susceptible to persuasion about the obligations of jihad. What prevails in their minds is a 
romanticized notion of a fight between oppressed Islam and the unjust West.11  
According to anti-terrorism officials, converts have been used in the past for proselytism, 
logistics or support but now they are also ready to be used actively in terrorist operations. 
This new terrorist recruitment strategy is intended to benefit from the probability that the 
newly recruited terrorist’s physical appearance will arouse less suspicion in the eyes of 
European police forces who are looking for a specific physiognomy, that is, a Middle 
Eastern appearance. Moreover, according to anti-terrorist officials, a remarkable number 
of these converts are women. This complicates even more attempts to rely on an 
“expected” terrorist profile. The physical appearance enables them to cross national 
borders without thorough inspections. They can, therefore, serve as front men (or 
women) for renting accommodations and providing several kinds of logistical support.12 
National European police forces have already arrested a handful of converts on charges 
of terrorism activity; and they are now focusing on this subset as a potentially growing 
threat, despite the small number of converts under suspicion.13  
                                                 
10 Olivier Roy, “Euroislam: the Jihad within,” The National Interest, March 23, 2003, at: <http:// 
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2003_Spring/ai_99377576/pg_6 - 48k ->. 
11 Craig S. Smith, “Europe Fears Islamic Converts May Give Cover for Extremism,” The New York 
Times, 19 July 2004. 
12 Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, Integrating Islam, Political and Religious Challenges in 
Contemporary France (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2006), 250. 
13 Craig S. Smith, “Europe Fears Islamic Converts May Give Cover for Extremism,” The New York 
Times, 19 July 2004. 
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Conversion often happens in prisons or mosques. The Islamic population has been 
increasing at high rates in Europe’s prisons. In British prisons, eight percent of the 
inmates are of Muslim origin, although Muslims account for only three percent of the 
total population.14 Inevitably prisoners come into contact with already radicalized 
individuals and are exposed to extremist Islamic ideologies. Occasionally they embrace 
jihadist obligations in order to compensate for previous sentiments of idleness and 
lacking a clear purpose in life. Conversions in mosques sometimes stem from the 
combination of societal marginalization and rigorous proselytization. 
3. The “Insiders” 
The third category of people susceptible to recruitment consists (according to 
Robert Leiken’s typology) of “insiders.” According to his definition, insiders “are a 
group of alienated citizens, second—or third—generation children of immigrants who 
were born and bred under European liberalism.”15 Taking into account the fact that the 
Muslim population has in Europe more than doubled in the last thirty years and that the 
rate of growth is accelerating, it is not surprising that “insiders” constitute the main pool 
for recruitment to jihadist terrorism. First generation Muslims do not belong in this 
category, probably because they initially viewed their stay in Europe as temporary.  
Living in impoverished conditions, they had no time for complaining about unsatisfactory 
social accommodation. Eventually a large percentage of these first generation immigrants 
decided to stay in Europe permanently and brought their families as well.  
However, the children and grandchildren of this first generation seem to be less 
integrated into West European societies than immigrants from Eastern Europe. Their 
educational achievements and skill levels are lower than those of most citizens. Muslim 
women rarely work outside the home, and their opportunities for advancement are 
limited. The unemployment rate among Muslims is almost double that of non-Muslims. 
All the above factors contribute to the isolation and self-encapsulation of Muslim youth. 
                                                 
14 Barbara Franz, “Europe’s Muslim Youth: An Inquiry into the Politics of Discrimination, Relative 
Deprivation, and Identity Formation,” Mediterranean Quarterly, (Winter 2007), 98. 
15 Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 4, (July/ August 2005), 
127. 
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Moreover, despite having grown up in Europe, they experience a cultural shock and feel 
repulsed by European societies’ secularism and materialism. 16 Many of the young men 
turn to Islam as a form of protest against these social and economic difficulties.17 The 
first stage of their radicalization is brainwashing by a radical imam. The latter may 
participate in terrorist recruitment himself or provide the contact to another recruiter.18 
4. Conclusions on the Three Categories of Potential Recruits to 
Extremism  
Even though this thesis does not intend to examine all sources of radicalization, it 
is important to summarize some of the key potentially radicalizing factors. 
Socioeconomic factors such as unemployment, discrimination, social exclusion, and lack 
of opportunity certainly play a significant role in this process. They are accompanied by 
the process of globalization not just on an economic level but also on political, social, and 
cultural levels. The globalization process is seen as a deliberate attempt to replace 
traditional Islamic structures with Western models for the sake of Westernization and 
modernization. Combined with the secularism and materialism that are characteristic of 
Western societies, this process of Westernization inflicts a cultural shock upon Muslims. 
Moreover, specific events, such as the intervention in Afghanistan authorized by the 
United Nations Security Council in order to remove Al Qaeda and the US-led 
intervention in Iraq, are portrayed as attacks against Islam itself.  
These factors affect all of the three aforementioned categories of Muslims. 
However, the case of second and third generation Muslims in Europe is of specific 
interest because they do not maintain links with their familial countries of origin. Such 
links could at least provide them with a non-religious source of personal identity. The 
refusal to assimilate into Western societies, owing to the secularism and superficial 
materialism of these societies, results in a gap in identity and a search for an imagined 
                                                 
16 Timothy M. Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,” The Washington 
Quarterly (Summer 2004), 33. 
17 Lorenzo Vidino, “Jihad from Europe,” Journal of International Security Affairs (September 2005), 
2. 
18 Michael Taarnby, “Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe. Trends and Perspectives,” Centre 
of Cultural Research, University of Aarhus (January 2005), 33. 
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community to fill it. Eventually—at least in some cases—this gap is filled by neo-
fundamentalism.19 The process of radicalization needs a vehicle to drive the potential 
victims from disapproval of the status quo to real action. This vehicle is exposure to 
radical ideas, and this can occur in several ways. In its most simplistic form, it may come 
from reading radical Islamic literature or consulting the Internet websites, which project 
radical views. Most importantly, however, radicalization seems to arise from interactions 
with people who are already radicalized, especially when these people are charismatic 
and effective in presenting and conveying their beliefs. Such individuals can be most 
readily found in mosques. Imams from outside Europe who are already committed to 
extremism may be the ideal recruiters. Moreover, the common denominator in all three 
categories of Muslims susceptible to recruitment is that in most cases the recruitment 
takes place in a mosque.   
These circumstances help to explain why this thesis focuses on religious 
education as a key factor in enabling young people to resist radicalization efforts by 
extremist religious leaders.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The scholarly literature on this topic is abundant, and it involves some 
controversy. This review of the literature concentrates on the works that provide an 
indispensable overview of the main features of the diverse approaches to religious 
education in Europe, including efforts designed to discourage radicalization and to 
promote tolerance and mutual respect and understanding.  
The member nations of the European Union and the Council of Europe have in 
recent years been cooperating more closely in political, social and economic terms. This 
means that they are bound to some extent to pursue common policies in order to deal with 
their common problems. Recent terrorist incidents in Europe indicate that terrorism is one 
of the serious common issues that they have to deal with. Moreover, it has been observed 
that in the past decade religion has been given special attention as a result of the 11 
                                                 
19 Olivier Roy, “Euroislam: the Jihad within,” The National Interest Inc, 2003, at: <http:// 
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2003_Spring/ai_99377576/pg_6 - 48k ->, 5. 
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September 2001 terrorist attacks. These events highlighted the Western world’s 
ignorance of Islam and the need to develop a more informed view of religious diversity.20 
From 2002 to 2005, the Council of Europe was engaged in a project entitled “The 
Challenge of Intercultural Education Today: Religious Diversity and Dialogue in 
Europe.” As John Keast has noted, this project signifies the important role that religious 
education can play in understanding people of other faiths and thus promoting tolerance 
among them.21  
Today, religious education reflects the great diversity among the European 
nations. This diversity stems from each country’s historical complexities and differences 
in languages, traditions and cultures. As a result of the above factors, religious education 
has been developed and provided in different ways. This stems in part from who has had 
the responsibility for such education. The state and religious communities are the main 
actors in the issue of religion and schooling.22 The extent to which each of these actors is 
involved determines the model of religious education provided in schools.  
Experts have provided several schemas on how European countries can be 
grouped according to the model of religious education they provide. For example, they 
can be grouped in three categories: 1) no religious instruction at schools; 2) confessional 
religious instruction; 3) non-confessional religious education.23 Of the four countries 
examined in this thesis, France is the only country that belongs in the first category, since 
the state does not allow the provision of religious education in public schools. In the 
confessional model the state approves the religions that may be taught, and pays the 
teachers’ salaries. Religious instruction is a responsibility of religious communities. They 
                                                 
20 Suzanne Rosenblith and Bea Bailey, “Comprehensive Religious Studies in Public Education: 
Educating for a Religiously Literate Society,” Educational studies, Vol. 42, No. 2, (September 2007), 101. 
21 John Keast, Religious Diversity and Intercultural Education: A Reference Book for Schools 
(Council of Europe Publishing, 2007). 
22 OSCE/ ODIHR Conference On “The Role of Freedom of Religion and Belief in a Democratic 
Society: Searching for ways to Combat Terrorism and Extremism,” Baku, Azerbaijan, 10–11 October 2002, 
found in Web site at: <http://www.osce.org/search/?a=1&limit=10&res=html&d=0&lsi=1&go-
2=Search...1...- 14k ->, 65. 
23 Jean-Paul Willaime,“Different Models for Religion and Education in Europe,” in Robert Jackson, 
Siebren Miedema, Wolfram Weisse, Jean-Paul Willaime, eds., Religion and Education in Europe (New 
York/ München/ Berlin: Waxmann Münster, 2007), 60. 
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are expected to select and train teachers, to design the curricula, and to decide what 
material is to be taught. In some cases, the state and religious communities cooperate 
with each other in order to deal with these issues. In most of the countries that apply a 
confessional model, religious instruction is an optional course, while in the cases where it 
is mandatory students are allowed to be excused. Several Northern, Eastern and Central 
European countries (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
and Spain) belong to this category.24 In non-confessional systems, the state has almost 
absolute control of religious education, and no religion is given special emphasis over the 
others. It is the state’s responsibility to select, train and pay the teachers, draft the 
curricula and choose the material to be taught. In some cases, the last task is implemented 
with the cooperation of religious bodies. Religious instruction is mandatory, but students 
may be excused. Northern European countries (e.g., Denmark, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom) belong to this category.25  
There are several other schemas describing the varieties of religious education 
models in Europe. Some are simpler than the ones described above: for example, the 
pluralistic integration model (e.g., France) and the confessional segregation model,26 and 
some involve more elaborate schemas, such as “mixed systems,” besides the confessional 
and the non-confessional models. Mixed systems distinguish England and Wales from the 
non-confessional model because, besides the state-funded public schools that provide a 
pluralistic and multifaith education, the state funds private faith schools that promote 
specific confessions.27  
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This brings up the issue of how private religious schools are treated by the state. 
Practices with regard to the right to establish such a school vary across European 
countries. In some cases, states apply strict policies against their establishment while in 
other cases they provide funds to religious communities in order to operate them.  There 
are also variations on how strongly state intervention is applied with regard to the content 
of the curricula provided by the religious communities.28 Religious schools, and 
especially those of the Christian faith, are generally popular in Europe because of their 
high academic standards. 
Distinctions regarding religious education are also made according to the aims of 
the subject. Robert Jackson, for example, has distinguished among educating into, about 
and from religion.29 Educating into religion means that a single tradition is taught in 
order for the students to strengthen their ties to that religion. Typically religious 
communities have the responsibility to design the curricula and train the teachers. 
Educating about religion does not seek to foster religious belief. It is focused on learning 
about the beliefs, values and practices of a religion from a descriptive and historical 
approach. It also intends to clarify how religion influences the behavior of believers and 
plays a role in shaping communities. Finally, educating from religion aims to prepare 
students to evaluate different perspectives on religious and moral issues, thus enabling 
them to develop their personal views in a reflective way.30 
Jackson has also identified three geographical areas in Europe that reflect the 
continent’s diverse religious history. Northern Europe has been influenced by 
Protestantism and southern Europe mainly by Catholicism, while in Eastern European 
states religion (mainly Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity) has reemerged since the 
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fall of communism.31 As Peter Schreiner has observed, in the latter region belong also 
some of the Balkan states. In the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars, religious education 
became an issue of high controversy, because in these countries religion and culture have 
always been associated with national identity and history. Moreover, during the 
communist era religions were suppressed, which meant that parents who wanted to 
educate their children in a religious manner had to do so secretly. This experience led 
Balkan peoples to distrust public education in religion.32 
Despite the many different ways religious education is treated, European nations 
have to deal with several similar challenges. According to Jean-Paul Willaime, 
secularization, the rise of atheism, the lack of contact by young people with religious 
practices, the existence of large Muslim populations in some states, the lack of 
knowledge about the beliefs of others, anti-semitism and Islamophobia are among the 
challenges that Europeans are trying to address by altering their approach to providing 
religious education.33 It is generally agreed, as noted previously, that religious education 
can play an important role in promoting tolerance among people of different faiths. 
Several strategies have been proposed to this end. A culture of tolerance presupposes that 
people are aware of other peoples’ religions and worldviews, even those of a secular 
nature.  Students can be taught about these issues in a specific course, as part of a history 
or civics course.34 Students should also learn to respect freedom of religion and the rights 
of others, which means that education about human rights should be included in school  
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curricula.35 Another important strategy is to develop interfaith and intercultural dialogue. 
Relevant studies have proven that religions share some common values. Teaching these 
values may contribute to respect for human rights.36  
Basic human rights declarations and conventions refer to freedom of religion and 
belief and provide that children shall enjoy the right to have access to religious education 
in accordance with the wishes of their parents. This principle restrains states in 
determining the content of religious teachings and confronts them with the challenge to 
strike a balance between promoting tolerance and accommodating the parents’ rights to 
decide on their children’s religious education.37 Moreover, all the above strategies are 
dependent on the capability of educators to implement them. This means that they should 
be able to adapt and advance their own knowledge in order to provide for the students’ 
needs. It also means that states should be able to provide the proper training to them. 
Rosemary Walters has examined several studies that deal with how teachers can acquire 
knowledge and develop communicative strategies in order to encourage constructive 
classroom dialogue. Religious education teachers can find appropriate resources, 
especially on the internet, and in particular those that emphasize sociological rather than 
theological principles.38 
Intercultural education for tolerance is often associated with peace education. In 
the words of a Council of Europe document, “The culture of peace is considered to resist 
violence through the promotion of human freedom and dignity, equality and respect for 
life and by introducing the learner to non-violent strategies, dialogue, mediation and non-
prejudiced perception of others.”39 Furthermore, religious and peace education are both 
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associated with citizenship education. According to a Council of Europe project in 
Education for Democratic Citizenship (EDC), citizenship education includes human 
rights education, civic education, peace education, global education and intercultural 
education.40 Citizenship education is of increasing importance for European 
governments, and it is provided in schools as a separate course, as part of other courses 
along with religious education, or as a cross-curricular subject.41 
Overall, it is clear that European countries place increasing importance on the role 
of religious education as an element in preparing students for responsible citizenship in 
pluralist societies. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The methodology employed in this thesis is a comparative case study analysis. 
The study cases examined are Albania, Britain, France and the FYROM. The study 
variable is the policies of these governments for the religious education of Muslims.  
The study cases were chosen to represent two groups of states that present 
different political and socio-cultural characteristics. The first group, which consists of the 
Western European states, is represented by France and Britain. These states have long-
standing democratic political structures, with an extended history of law and policy-
making, and they are members of the European Union. Moreover, citizens of these 
countries share Western values and beliefs. The second group, comprised of the Western 
Balkan states, is represented by Albania and the FYROM. These states are recently 
established constitutional democracies, and in recent years they have been continuously 
introducing legislation in order to enhance the implementation of their constitutional 
objectives. They both aspire to EU membership. The somewhat artificial dichotomy 
suggested by this thesis, between Western European states with a long history of law-
making and Western Balkan states with less experience in legislating but with the 
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potential to contribute innovative policy suggestions, is intended to provide useful 
insights in terms of policy recommendations. The thesis analyzes the policy options 
through a comparison of the four case studies. Moreover, other innovative measures with 
regard to religious education are suggested and examined in order to determine the extent 
to which they can contribute to countering Islamic radicalization. 
For its data, this thesis relies mainly on books, academic studies recorded in 
journals, national statistics and other publications. In addition, this thesis consults official 
documents of all the governments under examination in order to investigate their current 
policies regarding religious education. Taking into account the international implications 
of the problem, this study also investigates the major European institutions’ policies 
concerning religious education and counter-radicalization through the existing 
documentation in the European Union, Council of Europe, and Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe frameworks. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized as follows. Following the introduction, four chapters are 
devoted to the four study cases, namely Albania, Britain, France, and the FYROM. The 
organizational structure of these four chapters is identical in order to address the key 
issues in a systematic comparison. First of all, the thesis examines the historical 
background of Islam in each case, including the circumstances under which Muslim 
communities were established in each country. Second, this study considers Islamic 
extremism by reviewing the incidents of terrorism in each of the cases. It also establishes 
the connection between Islamic radicalization and the religious education of Muslims. 
Finally, it investigates current governmental policies with respect to religious education 
and considers the extent to which they are applied to religious communities and Muslim 
communities in particular. In the concluding chapter, the thesis compares these policies 
and offers recommendations as to how to prevent Islamic radicalization.  
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II. CASE STUDY OF ALBANIA 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ISLAM IN ALBANIA 
Albania today, 2.3 million Muslims comprise approximately 71 per cent of the 
total population of 3.3 million. The rest of the population is of Christian faith, mainly 
either Orthodox or Catholic, with a much smaller proportion Protestant. There is a further 
distinction between Sunni Muslims (55 per cent of the total population) and Bektashi 
Muslims (16 per cent of the Albanian people).42 The latter have historically supported 
Shiite retaliation against Sunni Ottoman power, but they are religiously tolerant towards 
the non-Muslim faiths. Bektashi believers do not observe conventional Islamic rules, 
such as abstaining from alcohol and requiring women to wear scarves, in their everyday 
life, and they reside mostly in rural areas. In contrast, Sunni Muslims are present in towns 
and cities, and they generally promote a much stricter interpretation of Islam than the 
Bektashis do.43  
In antiquity, the territory of modern-day Albania was inhabited by Illyrian pagan 
tribes, and with time they evolved into larger entities. Following the Roman invasion in 
168 A.D., the Illyrians underwent a cultural transformation to become the new Albanian 
population. At the same time they converted to Christianity. Because of the religious 
schism of 1054 A.D., which split Christianity into Eastern and Western churches, Albania 
was divided into a Catholic north and an Orthodox south.44 Albania's location at the 
juncture of the eastern and the western worlds provided a fertile ground for religious 
clashes. As a result many religious phenomena, such as apostasies, conversions, 
proselytism and heresies took place in the following centuries.45  
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There is no evidence of any Muslim presence in Albania before the occupation by 
the Ottoman Empire in 1385. Under Ottoman rule almost two-thirds of the population 
converted to Islam. This was a rather slow process that took place during the fifteenth, 
sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries.46 Albanians converted to Islam in order to avoid 
taxation and to attain positions in the empire’s administration or the military. Through the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries churches were gradually replaced by mosques.47 
According to some scholars, the Turks spread Islam by violent means. For example, 
following the 1645 Turko-Venetian War, in which Albanian Catholics supported their 
Italian co-religionists, forced conversions took place as a means of reprisal. This was also 
the case with the conversions of allies of the Orthodox Russians after the 1768 Russo-
Turkish war.48    
In 1912, Albania became an independent state. Until the Second World War 
freedom to practice religion was guaranteed, without an official religion recognised. 
From 1946 to 1992, when the country was governed by a communist regime, every form 
of religious practice was banned. The government believed that religion was a divisive 
force that served the interests of Italy (Roman Catholicism), Greece and Serbia 
(Orthodoxy), and Turkey (Islam). The division of the population among three religions 
made it impossible for institutionalized religion to fight against all the anti-religious 
legislation imposed by the communist regime.49 Islam proved to be the most vulnerable 
to state intervention since it was less organized than the Catholic and Orthodox churches. 
Moreover, the fact that the Bektashi sect was not formally recognised exacerbated the 
antagonistic relations between Bektashi and Sunni Muslims.50 
The abolition of religion was a gradual process. It was initiated with the 1945 land 
reform law, which deprived religious organizations of their property. It was followed by a 
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1949 law that required religious communities to be loyal to the People's Republic of 
Albania.51 In the process, 1,200 mosques (along with the places of worship of other 
faiths) were destroyed, land and property owned by religious institutions were 
confiscated, and the clerics of all faiths were mistreated.52 In 1967, laws were introduced 
that prohibited any religious rites, and with the Constitution of 1976 religious activities 
were severely punished, even with death. By that time, Albania was considered an 
extreme example of an atheist state. Even though Albanians in their public lives followed 
the regime's lines with regard to religion, in their private lives they secretly kept their 
religious traditions alive, a practice known as crypto-atheism.53  
Since the fall of the communist regime in 1990, religion has been gradually 
reintroduced among the Albanians. At the Second Balkan Foreign Ministers' Conference 
held in Tirana in October 1990, Albania signed a declaration on human rights, including 
freedom of religion. Gradually, all three faiths (Catholicism, Islam, and Orthodoxy) re-
established religious organizations and started public observances legally.54 Until a new 
legal framework was introduced, several religious groups sent representatives to Albania 
in order to proselytize for their faiths.55 Among them, Wahhabi and Salafi fundamentalist 
groups tried to indoctrinate confused young Muslims. Their purpose was to persuade 
young Albanians to abandon a national Islam in the name of a universal one, which 
would fight against Western values. However, in the years that followed many 
Muslims—mostly young people—converted to Christianity, either Catholicism or 
Orthodoxy, in order to be allowed to pursue education in Italy or employment in 
Greece.56 
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B. ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN ALBANIA 
The first president elected after the communist period was President Sali Berisha. 
His right-wing Democratic Party used an anti-Communist platform and tried to appeal 
especially to Albanian Sunni Muslims. Berisha was supported by the United States, and 
following his election in March 1992 he tried to retain strong ties with the United States 
and NATO.57 The two main issues Berisha was occupied with were the restoration of 
Albania's weak economy and the promotion of the concept of “greater Albania.” 
According to this old concept (initially raised by the “Albanian League,” which was 
established in Prizeren, Kosovo, in 1878), the Albanians should aspire to unite all the 
lands of the Balkans inhabited by Albanians.58  
With regard to the economy, the Albanian government was disappointed with the 
failure of the West to fulfil its investment promises. Moreover, as mentioned above, 
during the communist era almost all places of worship were destroyed, and religious 
leaders were persecuted or even killed. As a result, because of the re-emergence of 
religion in Albanian life, believers of all faiths faced a great difficulty in practicing 
religion. Essentially, this meant that they needed money to rebuild mosques and churches 
and to pay the salaries of their religious leaders. Both these factors—that is, Western 
failures to invest, and religious needs―contributed to Berisha's decision to open the gates 
to the Islamic world in search of funds.59 In 1992, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 
offered bank investment for agriculture, transport, Arabic-language training and 
scholarships for young Albanians to study abroad in Islamic states. In the same year 
Albania joined the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).60  
The decision to become a member of the OIC allowed a whole new Muslim 
educational and clerical infrastructure to emerge in Albanian society. Moreover, by 1994, 
                                                 
57 Christopher Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate. The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the 
West (Westport, Connecticut–London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 29–30. 
58 Shaul Shay, Islamic terror and the Balkans (New Brunswick—London: Transaction Publishers, 
2007), 95–97. 
59 Christopher Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate. The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the 
West (Westport, Connecticut—London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 30. 
60 Ibid. 
 21
several Saudi and Kuwaiti companies were making substantial investments in Albania. 
The Arab-Albanian Islamic Bank, founded in 1994, provided funds for the construction 
of mosques, gave scholarships for Islamic religious studies abroad, and even paid 
Albanians to persuade the females of the family to wear the chador (a veiled outer 
garment). In this sense the bank became a propaganda instrument of the Saudi Wahhabis. 
61  
After a while, the rapid construction of the mosques has resulted in a lack of 
imams to staff all the necessary positions. This gap has been filled by the young 
Albanians who have studied abroad and returned to Albania. These new clerics, who 
have been indoctrinated in a stricter form of Islam, have demanded the radicalization of 
Islam in Albania. This has resulted in religious clashes with older Albanian Muslims who 
embrace a moderate form of Islam and who consider the young radicalized people 
potential terrorists.62 
Among the Islamic organizations that entered Albania in the post-communist era 
were Islamic terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. 
They presented themselves as commercial companies and, in exchange for comparatively 
small investments, they were given the time and opportunity to organize their terrorist 
infrastructure.63 Osama bin Laden visited Albania in 1994 as a Saudi businessman who 
wanted to offer humanitarian support. He funded the Al Haramain organization and his 
charities were mainly used for proselytizing, money laundering, and giving shelter to 
mujahedin and Arabs persecuted by their governments. 64  
During the late 1990s, Albania suffered from political and economic instability. 
This caused social unrest that peaked in riots, and the Albanian government was unable 
to react effectively. During these events, many guns, rounds of ammunition, and 
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explosives were stolen from the police munitions stores. Many of these weapons, as well 
as 100,000 blank Albanian passports, ended up in the hands of terrorists, as well as 
combatants of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).65  
The KLA was founded in 1995–1996. The majority of its founders came from 
radicalized ethnic Albanian Muslims from Kosovo and the entire ethnic Albanian 
community worldwide. Inspired by the war in Bosnia and the division of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, which granted autonomy to the Bosniaks, the KLA undertook an armed 
struggle in order to promote Kosovo's independence from Serbia.66 Initially, the KLA 
demanded that Kosovo be granted the status of an independent republic in the Yugoslav 
Federation. Following Serbia's refusal to satisfy its demands, the KLA aspired to the 
establishment of an Islamic state, which would include all the Albanian-speaking 
populations of the Balkans. In the words of the KLA spokesman, Jakup Krasniki: “We want 
more than independence—the reunification of all Albanians of the Balkans.”67 During the 
course of the war it was found that several mujahedin from abroad, such as Afghans, 
Algerians, Egyptians and Bosnian Muslims, offered their services as KLA volunteers.  
Several thousand mujahedin had previously participated in the Bosnian war. 
Some of these fighters were Arab Wahhabi volunteers who wanted to transform the 
Bosnian struggle for independence into a terroristic jihad despite the fact that the majority 
of Bosniaks did not want this. Following the end of this war with the 1995 Dayton 
settlement, they found a new field of action in the Albanian-speaking lands. 
Subsequently, they infiltrated the more remote Albanian towns and villages in order to 
preach their jihadist ideology.68 
Young Albanians who received a radicalized Islamic education in foreign Islamic 
universities, Wahhabi fighters who settled in Albania in the aftermath of the Balkan wars, 
and “outsiders” who poured into the country with the support of the already established 
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Islamic organizations have strived to create an Islamic political movement in Albania. 
However, the Albanian Muslim society –both Sunni and Bektashi– has always advocated 
a rather moderate form of Islam and retained a tolerant stance towards other faiths. Thus, 
the aforementioned Islamic political movement has not succeeded in winning over the 
Muslim masses in Albania. It is nevertheless a fact that the seeds of Islamic extremism 
exist in Albania, and this constitutes a threat to Albania's social stability and a potential 
terrorism threat for the rest of the world. 
C. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN ALBANIA 
The main provisions concerning religious laws are found in the Albanian 
Constitution approved in 1998. The Constitution provides for the free practice of religion 
and regulates the relations between the State and religious communities.69 One of the 
most important articles of the Constitution, Article 10, provides that there is no official 
religion in the Republic of Albania. Moreover, it provides that the state and the religious 
communities mutually respect each other's independence and work together for the good 
of all. Furthermore, religious communities have the status of legal persons, which means 
that they have the right to own and manage their property without the government’s 
interference.70 Moreover, some of them have already benefited from the process of 
restitution and compensation for property that was confiscated by the communist regime. 
However, due to the principle of separation between the state and the religious 
communities, the government has no obligation to provide funds to religious 
institutions.71 So, even though Albanian law permits the construction of places of 
worship, the financing of such buildings by the state is prohibited. This has resulted in 
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foreign Islamic organisations taking control by funding the construction of most of the 
500 currently existing mosques.72 
Besides the Constitution, the Criminal Code of the Republic of Albania (which 
entered into force in 1995) also provides for the protection of religious rights. Articles 
131 and 133 prohibit obstructing the activities of religious organizations, such as 
religious ceremonies, and Article 132 prohibits ruining or damaging places of worship.73 
Moreover, it was considered important that the main constitutional provisions with regard 
to religion be further elaborated and implemented with a law on the religious 
communities.74 The Albanian government, with the cooperation of the religious 
communities, has prepared the Draft Law on Religious Communities, which functions as 
a basis for discussions among them. 
The draft law deals with some important previously unresolved issues, such as the 
definition of the terms “religious community” and “religious association.” Specifically, 
according to Article 11: “The religious communities are made up by the people who 
belong to the same religion or belief,” and, according to Article 12: “Religious 
associations are voluntary social unions of the people united under the same religion or 
belief, statute and program.”75 The draft law safeguards the fundamental religious right to 
teach and educate on religion or beliefs in places that are suitable for this purpose (Article 
2). Accordingly, it provides for the right of the religious communities and associations to 
construct and use buildings and temples, as well as to establish institutions to ensure the 
education of their religious personnel (Articles 16 and 17). Moreover, they have the right 
to build, establish and manage their schools in accordance with the provisions on 
                                                 
72 Miranda Vickers, “Islam in Albania,” Advanced Research and Assessment Group of Defence 
Academy of the United Kingdom (March 2008), 2. 
73 Silvo Devetak, Liana Kalcina and Miroslav F. Polzer, eds., "Legal Position of Churches and 
Religious Communities in South—Eastern Europe," ISCOMET —Institute for Ethnic and Regional Studies, 
2004, 200. 
74 Evis Karandrea, “Church and State in Albania,” in Silvio Ferrari, W. Cole Durham, Jr, eds., Law 
and Religion in Post Communist Europe (Peeters Publishers, 2003), 28. 
75 Silvo Devetak, Liana Kalcina and Miroslav F. Polzer, eds., "Legal Position of Churches and 
Religious Communities in South—Eastern Europe," ISCOMET —Institute for Ethnic and Regional Studies, 
2004, 204. 
 25
education (Article 17). Financial assistance and other contributions from juridical and 
physical persons, native or foreign, are allowed.76  
Albanian law allows pre-university public and private education systems 
according to the Law on the Pre-university Education System signed in 1995. Religious 
education is prohibited in public schools, and ideological and religious indoctrination is 
forbidden (Article 7). Private educational institutions in which the teaching is performed 
in Albanian can be established only through and by the decision of the Ministry of 
Education and Science. Schools affiliated with a religion can be licensed with the 
permission of the Council of Ministers, in accordance with a proposal by the Ministry of 
Education. It is mandatory that they offer a curriculum that is not in opposition with the 
national interests of Albanian legislation and public order, requirements that are 
supervised by the Ministry of Education. Permission for opening private schools, 
including religious ones, can be granted after one year from the date of application 
(Article 44).77 Religious schools share the same financial fate as the mosques, since they 
can not be funded by the state.78 Higher public education functions under the same 
secular provisions, while the establishment of private religious faculties and universities 
is not forbidden.79  
Albanian Muslims are concerned about education, because the existing Islamic 
educational facilities are inadequate and do not provide proper studies. Currently there 
are seven Muslim schools (madrassas) that function under the jurisdiction of Islamic 
organizations, but they are run under basic conditions. Teachers are poorly educated and 
underpaid.80 As with the construction of mosques, foreign Islamic organizations have 
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taken control by funding the construction of new madrassas and by providing religious 
publications. Furthermore, they have provided young Albanian Muslims with educational 
scholarships to Arab and Asian countries. In 2006, it was reported by the Department of 
Education of the Albanian Muslim Community that at least 1,357 Albanian students were 
studying in foreign Islamic universities. 81 According to the State Committee on Cults, 
the total number of students who have studied in Muslim countries over the last 15 years 
may have reached several thousand.82 These young men and women have obtained a 
much stronger sense of Islamic identity than older generations of Albanian Muslims; they 
have dominated several of the mosques and have thus promoted fundamentalist 
teachings.83 Albanian Muslims strive for the opening of an Islamic University in order 
that ministers of their religion, along with school teachers, may be educated in Albania. 
In 2005, the Albanian Muslim Community (AMC), one of the strongest Muslim 
organizations, was granted permission by the government to found such a facility. The 
AMC plans to open a bank account in order to raise funds for its construction.84 
The wearing of religious clothing or symbols is not prohibited by Albanian law. 
However, the school authorities have the right to apply an appropriate dress code, and 
they have occasionally forbidden the exhibition of religious symbols by students. This 
has resulted in the expulsion of two female students from public high schools for wearing 
traditional Muslim headscarves.85  
                                                 
81 Miranda Vickers, “Islam in Albania,” Advanced Research and Assessment Group of Defence 
Academy of the United Kingdom (March 2008), 10. 
82 Mentor Nazarko, “Religious Divergences in Albania and Balkan Security,” in James Pettifer, 
Mentor Nazarko, eds., “Strengthening Religious Tolerance for a Secure Civil Society in Albania and the 
Southern Balkans ,” NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 27 
( November 2007),16. 
83 Miranda Vickers, “Islam in Albania,” Advanced Research and Assessment Group of Defence 
Academy of the United Kingdom (March 2008), 3. 
84 Ibid., 11. 
85 United States Department of State, 2008 Report on International Religious Freedom —Albania, 19 
September 2008, found in Web site at:<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48d5cbd1c.html>. 
 27
III. CASE STUDY OF BRITAIN 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ISLAM IN BRITAIN 
According to a 2001 census, about 1.6 million Muslims reside in the United 
Kingdom out of the total population of 60 million. In the post-Second World War era, 
labor shortages prompted significant numbers of immigrants to come from the 
Commonwealth countries of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.86 During the 1950s, there 
were no legal restrictions on Muslim immigrants. These first generation Muslims 
evidently intended eventually to return to their homelands, after having saved a sufficient 
amount of money to build a house and open a small business. Taking that into account, 
the British government gave little consideration to their religious needs at the time. 
Muslims conducted their religious services in improvised prayer halls. 
In 1948, the British Nationality Act gave immigrants from Commonwealth 
countries access to all the rights and privileges of British citizenship. This factor, along 
with economic and educational opportunities, encouraged South Asian immigrants to 
become permanent citizens.87 This liberal immigration policy lasted until the early 1960s. 
Since then, both Labour and Conservative British governments have adopted legislation, 
such as the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act, in order to limit further 
immigration.88 In the face of these developments, immigrants have brought their families 
from their countries of origin to join them. This has resulted in a further expansion of the 
ethnic minorities, including those of the Islamic faith. 
B. ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN BRITAIN 
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Britain. Terrorism related to Ireland has 
been an issue for the British authorities since the nineteenth century. Even though 
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ethnicity, class, and religion have been intertwined in this conflict, religion has not been 
the primary motivator for the Irish terrorists. Terrorism related to religion in the form of 
Islamic extremism only became a priority for the British government after the terrorist 
attacks against the United States in 2001.89 Two other significant differences between the 
two types of terrorism are that Islamic terrorism involves suicide bombings and that it (in 
contrast with most Irish acts of terrorism) intends to cause massive and indiscriminate 
casualties, including civilians.90  
The first incident of Islamic terrorism in the UK dates back to April 1980, when 
six armed members of the Democratic Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of 
Arabistan seized the Iranian embassy in London, and took 26 people as hostages. The 
terrorists were trained by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and their main demand was 
the autonomy of the Iranian province of Khuzestan, which is located adjacent to Iraq. 
After the terrorists killed the Iranian press attaché, the British Special Air Service (SAS) 
stormed the embassy under the orders of the Prime Minister at the time, Margaret 
Thatcher. The terrorists killed a hostage before five of them were shot dead.91 Even 
though this event signalled a new type of terrorism, it did not prompt the British 
government to focus on Islamic extremism.92 
Aside from this incident, during the 1980s and 1990s no Islamic terrorist incidents 
took place in the UK. However, during this period many international developments 
contributed to the fact that British Muslims adopted a much more politicized and 
confrontational sense of their religious identity.93 During the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan in the decade between 1979 and 1989 the United States and Britain armed 
and trained Afghan fighters. These mujahedeen finally drove out the Soviet invaders, a 
victory that gave new meaning to the concept of jihad (holy war) as a means of protecting  
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the Islamic faith from unbelievers. The Western powers, inhabited mainly by Christians, 
assisted the efforts of the mujahedeen at the time, but could not even imagine that they 
would be the next target of Islamic fervor.94 
The Iranian revolution in 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini came to power and 
transformed Iran into an Islamic state, cemented Islam as a potent political ideology. For 
British Muslims who could not put up with Britain's secular society, the new Iranian state 
was a triumph for Islam, a fact that reinforced their religious identity.95 This became 
obvious in 1989, when Salman Rushdie published his novel, The Satanic Verses. It was 
considered offensive to the Islamic faith and caused an uproar in several Islamic states. 
The Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, demanded that Rushdie along with everybody 
involved in this publication be sentenced to death. Several British Muslims supported 
Khomeini's radical demands and protested on the streets against the book.96  
Despite the fact that terrorist acts did not take place in Britain during this period, 
the radicalization process was already under way. This was coupled to the fact that many 
Islamic extremists poured into Britain and organized terrorist groups. The openness of 
British society and the laws focused on the rights of individuals led to the UK becoming a 
significant node in several international terrorist networks.97  
Islamic radicals who were persecuted abroad came to Britain, which does not 
extradite people unless the country that requests the extradition can provide for their 
safety.98 In other words, the British government demands assurances that the repatriated 
individual will not be killed or tortured. The UK has also provided political asylum to 
several “freedom fighters,” mainly from the Middle East and North Africa. A prime 
example is the case of the Algerian Rachid Ramda. The French government requested his 
extradition in 1995, 1996 and 2001 for the deaths of eight people and the injuries suffered 
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by another 150 in an attack on the Saint-Michel metro station in Paris in 1995 to which 
Ramda contributed financially. It took ten years and the 9/11 events for the British 
authorities to finally decide to extradite him.99 In the meantime the tolerant stance of the 
British government offered fertile ground for terrorist groups to expand without any 
official monitoring, for propaganda material to be circulated, for recruitment to take 
place, and for finances for terrorist purposes to be raised.100 
One of the well-known radical organizations, al-Muhajiroun (the Emigrants), was 
founded by Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed. The primary goal of al-Muhajiroun is to 
implement Sharia law in the UK and to unite all Muslims under a caliphate without 
national borders. Bakri has called Trafalgar Square the Mecca of Muhajiroun, and 
England the capital of the Islamic world.101 He has also called the 9/11 terrorists the 
“magnificent 19” and the 7/7 terrorists the “fantastic four.” The organization is focused on 
the recruitment of students in order for them to join militant groups abroad and on 
providing funds for these groups.102 In addition, it distributes propaganda material that 
promotes hatred against the UK and the West. 
One of the prominent figures among the Islamic extremists in Britain is Abu 
Hamza al-Masri, a radical preacher who has operated in the Finsbury Park Mosque in 
North London. Even though Yemen has requested his extradition for his participation in 
terrorist actions, the British authorities refused to extradite him because of his asylum 
status.103 The Finsbury Park Mosque has been associated with the recruitment of 
Muslims in order for them to fight in holy wars abroad, as well as with the distribution of 
radical Islamist propaganda.  
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Several terrorists are considered to have been connected with Abu Hamza. 
Among them was Richard Reid, known as the “shoe bomber.” On 22 December 2001, 
during a flight to Miami, he tried unsuccessfully to detonate explosives hidden in his 
shoes. He was put on trial and sentenced to life imprisonment.104 Other individuals, such 
as Zacarias Moussaoui, who was connected with the 9/11 attacks, and Abu Doha, who 
was allegedly involved in a plan to bomb the Los Angeles airport, were closely connected 
to Abu Hamza. Hamza himself was finally arrested in 2004 and convicted two years later 
on 11 charges related to terrorism.105  
The list of terrorist organizations active in the UK includes those associated with 
Al Qaeda. In 1994 the Advisory and Reformation Committee was established by Osama 
bin Laden as a department functioning as a “media information centre.” Its role was 
mainly to publish bin Laden's statements, and to secretly recruit members for military 
operations.106 The Committee for Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) was another Al 
Qaeda organization, which, according to its founder Mohammed al-Massari, was the 
“ideological voice” of Al Qaeda. Through its website in the internet, the organization 
called for attacks against coalition forces and the deaths of U.S. President George W. 
Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Besides propaganda, the CDLR has 
participated in terrorist activities in East Africa, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.107 
Even though an elaborate system of terrorist organizations already existed prior to 
the 7/7 bombings, virtually all terrorist activity stemming from these organizations took 
place outside the United Kingdom. Terrorist operations have been carried out in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, 
Tanzania and the United States.108 The fact that these operations took place far from 
British shores may have contributed to the failure of British authorities to pay more 
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attention to the terrorist network that was gradually growing in the UK.109 According to 
Melanie Phillips, there was “a kind of unspoken ‘gentlemen’s agreement’” that if the 
British government left the Islamic extremists alone they would not turn against the 
country that protected them.110 The Blair government’s response in regard to the 
domestic Islamic terrorist threat was to promote new legislation (Terrorism Act 2000, 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, and 
Terrorism Act 2006) that gave the police additional powers.  
The British security services had enormous gaps in intelligence with regard to 
Islamic organizations, even after the 9/11 events. As a result, the 7 July 2005 bombings 
found them unprepared.111 That day four young men, Mohammad Sidique Khan, 
Shehzad Tanweer, Jermaine Lindsay, and Hasib Hussain, entered the London tube system 
carrying explosives. At 8.50 a.m. and for the next 60 seconds the bombs carried by the 
first three men exploded. The fourth bomber, because his train was running late, climbed 
a London bus instead. At 9.47 a.m. he detonated his bomb, raising the dead to a total of 
52 people and the injured to 700.112 
C. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN BRITAIN 
Scholars generally agree that British immigration policy is based on the principle 
of multiculturalism. This means that the state allows minority groups to participate in 
their own social structures and to maintain their customs and religious practices. 
Moreover, the national education system is expected to embrace cultural pluralism and to 
support all religions equally.113  
Nevertheless, some experts hold, in practice, prejudice and discrimination that 
have often been reflected in governmental practices. To begin with, the United Kingdom 
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lacks a legal framework in which religious rights are considered fundamental. Muslims 
have, however, been allowed to practice their religion in accord with the civil law. The 
1976 Race Relations Act prohibited discrimination on racial and ethnic grounds but not 
on religious grounds. Even though the reaction of the first generation Muslim immigrants 
was quite mild (they minimized the religious features of their identity), eventually the 
problem came to the surface with second- and third-generation Muslims. They regarded 
British social and cultural values as dangerously secular, and they turned to Islam in 
seeking cultural identity and pride. In order to keep their faith alive and pass it to the next 
generation, they started forming religious, social, educational and political 
organizations.114 
The 1976 Race Relations Act and the Race Relations (Amendment) Act of 2000 
are, some observers maintain, insufficient to provide the same protection for Muslims as 
for ethnic groups, because of the absence of clear legislative guidelines regarding the 
meaning of “race” and “ethnic origins.” Muslims are not considered as a single group 
identified by the same race, color, nationality, ethnic or national origin, so they are 
excluded from protection by the provisions of the Act.115 The Employment Equality 
(Religion or Belief) Regulations appear to constitute the only existing legislation that has 
to do with preventing religious discrimination. These regulations prohibit discrimination, 
harassment and victimization on grounds of religion and belief with respect to 
employment and vocational training.116 The British government has also adopted the 
Human Rights Act of 1998, which is in line with the European Convention on Human 
Rights provisions on religious freedom. However, the Act specifically addresses the  
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responsibilities of the state towards individuals. This is the reason why Muslims assert 
that it is not a sufficient legal tool to protect them against the actions of private 
individuals.117 
The United Kingdom’s “blasphemy law,” when it still existed, also proved to be 
insufficient to protect the religious rights of Muslims, in contrast with Christians. The 
blasphemy law prohibited “insult to the tenets and beliefs of the Church of England,” 
thus excluding other religions from its protection. A typical example is the Salman 
Rushdie Affair. The efforts to prevent The Satanic Verses, Rushdie’s 1988 book, from 
being published in the United Kingdom, and to bring the author to trial via the blasphemy 
law for having blasphemed the Prophet Mohammad and his wives, were unsuccessful. On 
the other hand, the law was successfully invoked against insults to Christianity. In 1977, 
Mary Whitehouse prosecuted the magazine Gay News for the publication of James 
Kirkup’s poem “The Love that Dares to Speak its Name,” which presented a gay 
portrayal of Jesus. The editor of the magazine, Denis Lemon, was sentenced to 9 months’ 
imprisonment; and the magazine was fined 1,000 British pounds. Muslims argued that the 
law discriminated against them and that it should be extended to include Islam, rather 
than just Christianity.118 Instead, the British government introduced the Criminal Justice 
and Immigration Act of 2008 with a specific amendment to abolish the “common law 
offenses of blasphemy and blasphemous libel.” This rendered the Muslim argument for 
equal protection against blasphemy moot, since now no religion in the United Kingdom 
enjoys legal protection regarding blasphemy.119 
The most important public policy area that Muslims are concerned with is 
education. Even though they see a better future for their children through education, they 
recognize at the same time that public schools might undermine their religious values.120 
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In the years immediately after World War II, religious education in the United Kingdom 
was Christian-oriented, since there was little religious diversity at the time. The 
Education Act of 1944 provided that religious education must be included in the public 
school’s curriculum and that collective worship should be conducted at the beginning of 
the day. However, it was not specified that both religious education and worship should 
be of a Christian character. It was rather considered obvious that it would be so, since 
Christianity was the predominant religion at the time. The Act also introduced the Agreed 
Syllabuses for Religious Instruction. Local Education Authorities (LEA) were assigned to 
conduct a Syllabus Conference in which the Church of England and “other 
denominations” were supposed to participate. However, besides the Anglican Church, 
only Protestant Christians were represented. Other religions were ignored. It was not until 
the 1970s that the LEA allowed non-Christian representatives to participate in the 
conferences.121  
The Education Act of 1988 specified that religious education and collective 
worship would be mainly of a Christian character but nevertheless would take into 
account the teachings and practices of other religions. In practice, school authorities 
retain flexibility to make adjustments in their religious curricula, according to the local 
parents’ preferences. In addition, every student can exercise the right of withdrawal from 
religious education lessons if he considers them inconsistent with his religious values.122 
The government has also established Standing Advisory Councils on Religious Education 
(SACREs) to supervise the use of Agreed Syllabuses. Efforts are made to ensure that the 
minimum number of students exercise their right of withdrawal.123 The Education Act of 
1988 provided also that the educational curriculum in state schools must promote “the 
spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils at the school and of 
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society.” This meant that religious education, in addition to involving the study of 
religion, should also have a positive effect on each student’s personal development.124   
In 1994, the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) in 
cooperation with religious communities drafted model syllabuses that included material 
on Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Sikhism. These were available 
for the Local Education Authorities to consult during Agreed Syllabus Conferences. The 
government has also introduced a National Framework for religious education. This was 
drafted by the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, which was commissioned by the 
Department for Education and Skills. Religious communities and other NGOs were 
consulted, and the final project was published in October 2004. The National Framework 
for religious education is intended to improve the quality of teaching, contribute to the 
personal development of students, and support a plurality of materials for religious 
education. It also allows for the study of non-religious philosophies.125  
Even though, according to studies, Muslim organizations are more likely to report 
unfair treatment in education than their Christian, Jewish or Buddhist counterparts, 
school officials have in general tried to satisfy their demands. Issues such as dress codes 
for girls participating in physical education classes, provision of halal meat, and time off 
for religious holidays have been resolved according to their needs. The wearing of the 
hijab (headscarf), which is an issue of considerable political controversy in France, raises 
no questions in the United Kingdom. When the colors of the headscarf are the same as 
those of the school’s uniform, the headscarf may be worn. 126  
Another major political issue is that the government until recently granted 
economic aid for Anglican, Catholic and Jewish schools but not for Muslim ones. This 
was regarded as more a matter of civil rights for the Muslim community than an 
educational issue. The performance of Muslim children in their studies is in general 
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below that of the national average, and parents hold that this is a result of attending state 
schools. In addition, Muslim parents argue that Muslim schools are necessary to promote 
Islamic values in a secular environment.127 The 1944 Education Act made a distinction 
between two kinds of state-maintained schools. The first kind consisted of the County 
schools (public schools) that were entirely funded by the state. The second kind was 
composed of the Voluntary schools initially funded by religious organizations. Over time, 
these Voluntary schools went into partnership with the state. There are three types of 
Voluntary schools: Aided, Controlled and Special Agreement Voluntary schools. 
Controlled and Special Agreement Voluntary schools are entirely funded by the 
government. In contrast, religious organizations can contribute to financing the 
construction and maintenance of the Voluntary Aided schools. Such contributions give 
them the right to appoint the majority of governors in the school’s councils. 
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Muslims founded their first religious 
schools in the United Kingdom. The Muslim organizations that financially supported 
these schools applied to the Department of Education for economic aid. Initially, all of 
the applications were turned down.128 Critics of Muslim private schools asserted that the 
participation of Muslim children in state schools would help them to get effectively 
integrated into British society. Muslims were diametrically opposed to this argument if it 
meant that their children had to assimilate liberal and secular values instead of retaining 
their own Islamic values. 
In 1997, the Labour government changed its policies in favor of a pluralistic faith 
school system. Since then the government has provided funding to religiously affiliated 
schools of multiple faiths, rather than just Christian schools. In 1998, the School 
Standards and Framework Act introduced four types of school eligible for state funding. 
These were: Community (formerly County), Foundation, Voluntary Aided, and 
Voluntary Controlled schools. All three types except Community schools are allowed to 
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have a religious character. Moreover, Voluntary Aided schools can provide 
“denominational” religious education, while Voluntary Controlled and Foundation 
schools with a religious character must follow the Agreed Syllabuses.129 In 2006, there 
were 7,000 faith schools in total, of which 4,646 were Church of England schools, 2,041 
Roman Catholic, 37 Jewish, 9 Muslim, 2 Sikh and 1 Hindu.130 
The British educational system has been in general quite helpful and 
accommodating for Muslim needs. However, as mentioned previously, radicalization and 
recruitment often occur at mosques. It should be noted that mosque building is not a 
matter of controversy in the United Kingdom. It is as easy to build one, as it is to build 
any other religious edifice.131  
Integration has nonetheless not occurred for many British Muslims at various 
socioeconomic levels. The unemployment rate among Muslims is three times that of the 
general population, and poverty—especially for Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslims—is 
an immediate result.132 Such factors, along with their rejection of secularism and 
materialism, lead them to seek a new identity. Radical Islamic clerics take advantage of 
that search for identity and purpose; and, by preaching the virtues of jihad; they manage 
to radicalize some Muslims, who become susceptible to recruitment into terrorist 
organizations.  
The United Kingdom has adopted several active measures in order to counter the 
risk that individuals may organize into groups and commit violent actions. According to 
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA), the Home Secretary has the 
power to issue a certificate against any non-nationals who are believed to threaten 
national security. These individuals can be extradited to another state for trial. If, 
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however, there is a prospect that in this other state he will be subjected to torture or 
inhumane and degrading treatment, he can be detained without trial in a British prison. 
This is the case with several Muslim men detained at Belmarsh high-security prison, 
which is often called the “British Guantanamo Bay.” 
On the basis of “Unacceptable Behaviors,” individuals can be deported or 
excluded from the UK. This legal regime includes people who write, publish or distribute 
material, preach or speak in public, or run a website in order to express radical views or 
incite people to commit terrorist acts. On such grounds of unacceptable behavior, 36 
foreigners have been deported to date. It seems, however, that such active measures may 
propel Muslims to frustration and fall short of countering terrorism as a whole. 
This study suggests that passive measures be incorporated in governmental 
policies in order to deal with the problem more effectively. Specifically a properly 
formulated religious education can help young people understand and respect different 
beliefs, practices, races and cultures. This would overall promote a culture of tolerance. 
In 2004, the UK announced that all “ministers of religion” coming from abroad who wish 
to preach in Britain must possess basic skills in English. Many British Muslims 
apparently back efforts designed to ensure that their clerics understand British culture and 
society. In order to achieve this objective, the UK government is in contact with faith 
communities on how to formulate additional requirements. It is hoped that more use of 
the English language and greater regard for British culture in mosques will help to bridge 
the cultural divide between Islam and mainstream British society. Moreover, citizenship 
study has been mandatory in British secondary schools since 2002. Civic understanding, 
responsibility and participation among young people are expected to foster a sense of 
belonging in Muslims and other minorities.133  
These are positive signs that the United Kingdom intends to use religious 
education as a tool to foster a culture of tolerance and mutual understanding. However, 
there is a lot yet to be done so that religious education actually serves as an effective tool 
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in the fight against terrorism. The UK government should consider removing any 
remaining restrictions in funding Voluntary Aided schools for Muslims and at the same 
time encourage Muslim parents to get positively involved in the running of these schools. 
Moreover, founding supplementary institutions for educating imams and teachers may 
help to limit the presence of foreign imams who may be proponents of radical views. 
Governmental authorities should cooperate with official Muslim associations or even 
with the authorities of the countries of origin of foreign imams, in order to specify the 
educational requirements for Muslim clerics and teachers. However, Muslim clerics and 
teachers should probably be educated in Europe, so that they have an understanding of 
European societies. Finally, Muslim teachers who have acquired a well-formulated 
religious education should be given an opportunity to participate in the drafting of the 




IV. CASE STUDY OF FRANCE 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ISLAM IN FRANCE 
Even though French authorities do not collect statistical information on citizens or 
residents in regard to their race, ethnicity or religion, it has been estimated that 
approximately 6 million Muslims reside today in France, or about ten percent of the total 
French population. As in the British case, mass immigration began after World War II 
because of a severe labor shortage. The immigrants’ main countries of origin were 
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. During their stay in France they forwarded 
money to their families back home, with the intention to return someday. As economic 
and occasionally political conditions in their homelands worsened, the plan to return 
faded with time.134 Specifically, the oil crisis in 1974 forced the French government to 
stop importing labor and to embrace a rather anti-immigrant policy or at least to restrict 
family reunification. In contrast to the French authorities’ ambitions, the temporary 
immigrants became permanent and managed in addition to bring their families to 
France.135 This resulted in France becoming one of the most multi-ethnic societies in 
Europe. 
B. ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN FRANCE 
Although there is a long history of political violence associated with French 
interactions with Muslim societies, this discussion is limited to the French experience 
with terrorism in the last thirty years. During this period France has encountered three 
distinct types of terrorism. The first type of terrorism was advocated by groups with a 
radical leftist philosophy. Action Directe was the most aggressive of these groups, and it 
consisted of home grown terrorists who were against the capitalist system and American-
led “imperialism.” The groups’ terrorist acts evolved from attacking material targets to 
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political assassination until they were finally dismantled by the French authorities in the 
late 1980s.136 The second type of terrorism is expressed by regional separatist groups. 
The most prominent of these groups act in the Basque Country (IK: Iparretarrak), in 
Brittany (FLB: Front de Libération de la Bretagne) and in Corsica (FLNC: Front de 
Libération National de la Corse), advocating independence or autonomy.137 The third 
type of terrorism encountered by the French government is international terrorism, which 
originates for the most part in the Middle East. 
The Renseignements Généraux (RG), the French intelligence service, estimates 
that about 5,000 salafists reside in France, 500 of who are considered potentially 
dangerous.138 The existing terrorist networks seek to recruit potential members among 
young Muslims who are radicalized and French citizens of a non-Muslim heritage who 
convert to Islam.139 
Among the first incidents of international terrorism in France during this period 
was a bomb explosion on 3 October 1980. Middle Eastern terrorists attached the bomb to 
a motorbike parked outside the synagogue on the Rue Copernic. The explosion killed 
four passers-by and wounded eleven people. This was one of the six attacks on Jewish 
targets that took place that week. The aim of the terrorists was to influence French 
foreign policy in the Middle East, and the French authorities did not anticipate such 
attacks.140 On 14 December 1999, the Algerian Ahmed Ressam was arrested on the US-
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attack on the Los Angeles International Airport. Even though Ressam was not a French 
national, he was being monitored by the French anti-terrorism authorities, who warned 
the Canadian authorities of his plans.141 
It is obvious that in the period between the two incidents mentioned above, 
French anti-terrorism capabilities increased enough to contribute significantly to the fight 
against terrorism. This did not happen overnight but was rather a process that occurred in 
several different stages. In the years before the 1980s, French governments had tried to 
insulate France from international terrorism by managing the country's foreign policy in 
such a way that it would be distant from issues related to international terrorism. In the 
same way that the British authorities thought that they had struck a “gentlemen’s 
agreement” with Islamic extremists, French authorities provided impunity to terrorist 
group members on the condition that they would not attack France. Jeremy Shapiro and 
Bénédicte Suzan describe this policy as the “sanctuary doctrine.” 142  
The advantage of this doctrine was that France could maintain good relations with 
states that supported terrorist groups resident on French soil. The drawbacks, however, 
were several. First of all, it created political problems with states that faced attacks by 
terrorists operating from France. Secondly, the French authorities had to secretly 
communicate with these terrorist groups in order to monitor them effectively. This 
contact, however, damaged the political profile of government parties during their 
electoral campaigns.143  
The most significant negative effect of the sanctuary doctrine was that terrorists 
were free to organize logistical and operational networks that could turn against France at 
any opportunity. This was the case with the bomb attack on the Rue Copernic mentioned 
above. Several similar attacks occurred during the early 1980s. One example was the 
1982 attack on the Rue Marbeuf in Paris. With the assistance of Palestinian terrorist 
groups, Syrians plant a car bomb outside the building of a pro-Iraqi newspaper; and the 
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explosion killed one person and injured sixty-three others. Even though both these attacks 
were a result of disputes among foreign states, the fact that they took place on French soil 
caused considerable public anxiety.144 
The peak of terrorist attacks during this period was reached in 1986 with a series 
of assaults on public buildings and infrastructure in Paris by the Committee for Solidarity 
with Near Eastern Political Prisoners (CSPPA).145 Fourteen terrorist incidents killed 11 
people and wounded more than 220. At the same time, French relations with several 
Muslim states worsened. French participation in the multinational force that intervened in 
the civil war in Lebanon, France’s opposition to the Libyan invasion of Chad, and the 
country’s role as a weapon supplier of Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war, caused frictions 
between France and Syria, Libya and Iran respectively. These three Muslim states took 
advantage of the existing Palestinian and Lebanese networks in France and conducted 
several attacks on French soil in order to influence the government's foreign policies in 
the Middle East.146 
Since French security services were unable to prevent the attacks, the government 
was left with no option but to try to improve its relations with the Middle Eastern states. 
For example, French authorities managed to strike a deal with Syria according to which 
the latter would stop supporting terrorist groups in France, provide intelligence on 
Lebanese terrorists, and secure the release of French hostages in Lebanon in exchange for 
French diplomatic support and the provision of arms and financial aid. A similar 
arrangement was made with Iran. Even though French authorities denied that both of 
these deals were actually concluded, they resulted in reduced international terrorist 
attacks on French soil during the period from 1987 to 1994.147 
Regardless what French foreign policy towards Muslim states was, it soon 
became apparent that the country’s anti-terrorism capabilities were inadequate. In order 
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to deal with this problem the French authorities decided to enhance the capabilities of the 
police and to upgrade the judicial system in regard to counter-terrorism. The first measure 
was the legislation of September 1986, which provided the establishment of new 
organizations specialized in terrorism. The role of these organizations, namely the Unité 
de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (UCLAT, within the Interior Ministry) and 
the Service pour Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (SCLAT, within the Justice 
Ministry), was to coordinate all the intelligence and security services within the French 
government on issues related to terrorism.148 
The 1986 legislation also provided for longer prison terms, as well as longer 
detention and investigation periods in regard to terrorist crimes. The most important 
provision, however, was the establishment of a small league of prosecutors and 
investigating magistrates within the Trial Court of Paris, which was assigned 
responsibility for the investigation of terrorist cases. These magistrates had expertise in 
specific types of terrorism, such as separatist or Islamic activities. As their capacity to 
deal with terrorist acts increased, they achieved a statutory independence from political 
authorities. This status denied policymakers a strong say in a significant matter of 
government policy, but at the same time it relieved them from the responsibility to 
answer to the public in potential failures to respond to terrorism.149 
The first serious terrorist incidents that the integrated French counter-terrorism 
mechanism had to deal with were those that resulted from the Algerian civil war and the 
subsequent spill-over on French soil. During the 1992 multi-party elections in Algeria, 
the army suspended the process and seized power because an Islamist party, the Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS), was going to win the elections. This fact frustrated several 
Algerian Muslims who organized themselves into the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and 
managed to gather support from Islamists in Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. The GIA, 
besides envisaging a seizure of political power in Algeria, also visualized a Caliphate that 
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would be established in Algeria and then expanded to the rest of the world. 150 Moreover, 
since the early 1990s, Al Qaeda has managed to penetrate the FIS, the GIA and the 
Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) in order to strengthen the ties 
among Islamic terrorist groups in Europe.151  
In the GIA members’ minds, France exploited Algeria’s resources during the 
colonial period. Moreover, they asserted, France supported the military junta that forced 
Algerian Muslims into slavery and drove them away from the Islamic religion. In view of 
these opinions, it was obvious even to the French authorities that France would be a 
highly probable target.152 The first terrorist incident related to the GIA took place in 
Algiers on 24 October 1993, when 3 French consular agents were held hostage. After 
their release, one of them carried back the terrorists’ message: “the security of French 
citizens in Algeria is under threat from this moment forward.”153 French authorities 
responded with a wave of arrests and interrogations in the framework of “Operation 
Chrysanthemum,” which was launched on 9 November 1993. The purpose of the 
measures taken was to send the message that radical Islamist activity on French soil 
would be suppressed.  
On 8 November 1994, French authorities dismantled the Chalabi network, a group 
known for its support for the armed struggle against the Algerian government. In 
response, on 24 December 1994, the GIA hijacked an Air France flight from Algiers to 
Paris. The message sent was that attacks would be carried out within France in the future. 
The GIA also demanded that France stop assisting the Algerian government and release 
FIS and GIA members who were held in custody. French special forces assaulted the 
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plane two days later and killed the terrorists. It was later found out that the terrorist plan 
was to crash the aircraft over central Paris or even into the Eiffel tower.154 
On 2 June 1995, French police arrested 131 people in Marseilles, Paris, 
Perpignan, Tourcoing and Orléans. The terrorists arrested belonged to a European 
network that supported Algerian terrorist groups, including the GIA. On 25 July 1995, 
terrorist attacks were committed in reprisals by networks operating in Lyon and in Lille. 
During a series of attacks between July and October 1995, 10 people were killed and over 
150 were injured.155  
The continuing fight with terrorism during the 1980s and the 1990s provided the 
French counter-terrorism authorities an understanding of Islamic extremism. This 
knowledge proved to be valuable because it allowed security services to successfully 
track down terrorist groups and arrest their members. Moreover, magistrates managed to 
reduce the time required for investigations. New legislation in 1995 and 1996 introduced 
the notion that “the participation in any group formed or association established with a 
view to the preparation, marked by one or more material actions, of any of the acts of 
terrorism provided for under the previous articles shall in addition be an act of 
terrorism.”156 This allowed the magistrates to conduct investigations before terrorist 
attacks were committed, thus upgrading significantly their prevention capabilities.  
C. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN FRANCE 
In order to integrate the immigrants into French society, the government founded 
institutions such as the High Council for Integration and the National Immigration Office, 
which would manage the migration flow and conduct immigration-related research.157 
Concerning the minorities’ religious accommodation, the French policy was (and 
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remains) governed by laïcité, meaning a secularist stance from the state that would not 
interfere in religious matters. The freedom of worship would therefore be restricted only 
by civil law while the state would not pay salaries to members of the clergy or fund any 
form of worship.158 The equality of all citizens before the law without regard for their 
origin, race, or religion is also established by the 1958 Constitution of the Fifth Republic. 
In practice, however, many Muslims complain that they do not enjoy true 
religious liberty. The debate over whether Muslim girls should wear the hijab at school is 
a premium example to which they refer to as a deprivation of their religious freedom. The 
“scarf affair” began when three Muslim schoolgirls were sent home by the principal of a 
public junior high school in a Paris suburb. After a week of negotiations, the school 
authorities and the Muslim parents reached the compromise that the girls would be 
allowed to wear the headscarves everywhere in the school except for the classroom. Ten 
days later, when the girls refused to remove their scarves, they were suspended again and 
the issue started to gain an enormous amount of public attention. Eventually, the Conseil 
d’Etat decided that wearing the hijab would be allowed as long as the function of the 
public schools was not disturbed. Because of the ambiguous wording of this decision, the 
current situation varies considerably according to the individual school principal’s 
orientation on the matter. The overall result of the debate is that many Muslim girls do 
not obtain a normal public education.159  
Other issues of minor importance in comparison with the “scarf affair” include the 
dress code for girls participating in physical education classes, the provision of halal 
meat, and the absence of religious education in the curriculum of French government 
schools.160 Even though the philosophical foundations of French state schooling are 
intended to offer equality before a body of knowledge, in practice they do not promote 
diversity. The languages of the minorities and the preservation of their cultural identities 
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have no place in French government schools. Students who wish to take Arabic classes 
have to obtain a special authorization and receive distance education courses only.161 
Even though Muslims are eligible to receive state aid for their private schools, in 
practice the educational authorities have approved funding for just two. The first one is 
located in Saint Denis-de-la-Réunion in Paris.162 The second is in Lille and functions 
under the auspices of the Islamic cultural centre of the city.163 This is a result of the strict 
preconditions that the private schools are obliged to satisfy, before funding can be 
approved. Namely, the school must have already been functioning for five years, the 
teachers must be well qualified, there must be an adequate number of students, and the 
school facilities must be clean. Considering that most Muslims in France lack substantial 
financial resources, the functioning of the school for five years may be impossible. 
Owing to hostility in some quarters to Muslim religious practices, the building of 
mosques has often faced local political opposition. Mosques are typically constructed 
under a legal framework that was initially used by the Catholic Church in the 1930s. 
Under this framework, a city should grant a lease of 18 to 99 years to a group wishing to 
build a house of worship.164 However, some of the French cities with the largest Muslim 
populations, such as Marseilles and Toulouse, have presented the greatest opposition to 
the construction of mosques. Despite the increase in the number of mosques in France 
over the last two decades, the existing facilities are still not enough to accommodate all 
the believers. Currently there are 8 “Grand Mosques,” 120 mosques accommodating 200-
1,000 people each, and more than 1,000 other places of worship.165  
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Since the late 1980s, the idea that every major French city should have a grand 
mosque has been voiced. The provision of financial support for building and maintaining 
these prayer halls was supposed to be a mechanism to ensure surveillance and monitoring 
of the practitioners of Islam. They would also become places for integration and not for 
fundamentalism and social division, since Islamic practice would be more transparent. 
However, now that a greater number of middle-sized mosques has been built, the idea of 
the grand mosques has been abandoned.166  
Moreover, the Muslims that practice their religion in the existing mosques are 
dependent for their activities on the personalities of the clerical leaders.167 Since there is 
no facility in France for the training of the imams, virtually all of them come from 
abroad. 40 percent come from Morocco, 24 percent from Algeria, 6 percent from Tunisia 
and 16 percent from Turkey. Their religious training is likely to be fundamentalist and to 
clash with secular French laws.168 This also means that they are not familiar with French 
society and the problems of the local Muslim communities, factors that make them 
incapable of acting as effective advisors and mediators.169 In the worst case scenario, 
they could be radical clerics who came to France in order to proselytize. 
Since the mid-1990s, France has developed a counter-terrorism strategy, which 
includes monitoring mosques, clerics and their sermons. This is conducted by the French 
internal intelligence service, the Renseignements Généraux (RG), and it has identified 
radical mosques almost everywhere in France. In practice, the RG agents collect the 
Friday sermons, analyze the information, and determine which imams are preaching a 
radical version of Islam, and whether they participate in terrorist activities by recruiting  
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new members or otherwise supporting terrorist networks. They specifically focus on anti-
Western rhetoric, anti-Semitism or open calls for jihads; and when this kind of 
information is identified, they increase their surveillance.  
According to RG estimates in 2006, 80 out of 1,685 places of worship were 
actively participating in radicalization and recruitment, while 40 out of these had links 
with radical Islamic networks. Even though half of these were trying to avoid radical 
pressure, the other half were already run by radical clerics. In the mid-1990s, the French 
parliament authorized a law for the deportation without trial of people who present a 
security threat, including foreign imams who preach a radical brand of Islam. The 
expulsion of these individuals (11 in 2005) is not only an active measure against 
radicalization, but a passive one also, since it gives the rest of the imams an incentive to 
moderate their discourse. However, Muslims who attend the sermons in a mosque do not 
necessarily get active in the mosque. They meet with each other there, but they might plot 
their activities later, without the knowledge of the local cleric. This would require a 
surveillance program to be applied not just to a mosque but also to the people attending 
its services, which would be a much more difficult project to accomplish.170 
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V. CASE STUDY OF FYROM 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ISLAM IN FYROM 
According to the last census, which was conducted in 1994, in FYROM almost 30 
percent out of the population of 1.9 million are Muslims, and they comprise the largest 
religious minority.171 The largest religious community is the Orthodox (66.3%), while 
Catholics and Protestants are in proportions smaller than 1%. Muslims are divided 
between those who adhere to Sunni Islam and those who adhere to Shiite Bektashi Islam, 
with the latter in the minority. Moreover, 22.9% of the Muslims are ethnic Albanians 
while the rest include ethnic Turks, Roma, and Bosnians. Some Muslims, called 
Torbeshi, were by ancestry inhabitants of the territory of the present state.172  
The Christian religion appeared in the territory now held by FYROM at the same 
time as in the rest of the Balkans. Historically this is connected with Saint Paul’s activity 
in the region.173 As in the case of Albania, the conquest of the Balkans by the Ottomans 
in the late 14th century introduced Islam to a land formerly inhabited by Christians. Islam 
was either coercively spread by the violent recruitment of young males to the Turkish 
military or in a voluntary manner, with practical inducements. Converts could avoid 
taxation or occupy positions in the Ottoman administration. Soon after the Ottoman 
occupation, many upper class landholders converted to Islam in order to safeguard their 
properties or even accumulate more possessions from the rulers. Conversion in towns 
often meant that converts adopted the Turkish language and culture. In rural areas, on the 
other hand, Christians resisted conversion, continued to build churches without official 
approval, and found innovative ways to lessen or even avoid taxation. Even those who 
were Islamized, in most cases, preserved their language and customs. Muslims who 
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resided in the eastern region of the territory now known as FYROM were named 
“Pomaks,” while those in the west were called “Torbeshi.”174 The majority of the 
mosques on FYROM’s territory today were built in the 15th and 16th centuries.  
During the period of Ottoman rule, which lasted until the Balkan Wars (1912-
1913), many Ottoman Muslims inhabited the land, and this explains their continuing 
presence in FYROM. This was a rather urban colonization, since the administrative, 
military, and judicial organs of the empire were concentrated in towns. According to 
existing evidence, until the mid- or late sixteenth century, the Muslim urban population 
continuously increased while the Orthodox Christian one decreased.175  
The demographic picture of FYROM was affected by the Albanian colonization 
that started in the second half of the 18th century and by the Bosnian Muslim migration 
after the Berlin Treaty of 1878, which put Bosnia-Herzegovina under the rule of Austria-
Hungary. In 1919, the territory now known as FYROM became part of the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. 
The territory now known as FYROM was considered “southern Serbia” at the time. In the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, there was no separation between church and state. The church 
performed several functions for the state, such as keeping registers for births, marriages 
and deaths. Some religious primary and secondary schools functioned under the 
jurisdiction of the churches, and religious education was compulsory.  After the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, FYROM received several thousands of Muslim refugees as a 
result of the Bosnia and Kosovo wars.176 
B. ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN FYROM 
During 2001, a clash took place in FYROM  between separatist Islamic terror 
organizations and the security forces of the national government. Several experts believe 
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that the fighting was a spill-over from the Kosovo war.177 After the occupation of 
Kosovo by NATO troops in 1999, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was converted 
into a security organization, named the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). However, 
several former KLA fighters did not continue their activity in the KPC. Instead, they 
established new guerrilla and terrorist organizations in order to resume their fight in the 
Balkans. Moreover, after the KLA was supposedly disarmed by the multinational NATO 
force, part of the weaponry ended up in the hands of these new terrorist groups.178  
Three organizations emerged after the dissolution of the KLA. The first one was 
the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac (PMBLA, or UCPMB in 
Albanian), which focuses on a region along the south-western border between Serbia and 
Kosovo. The remaining two organizations were the National Liberation Army (NLA, or 
UCK in Albanian) and the Albanian National Army (ANA, or AKSh in Albanian) whose 
combat epicentre was in FYROM. (The ANA is a terrorist organization, and it should not 
be confused with the official Armed Forces of Albania.) The NLA was the main entity 
that conducted the 2001 insurgency. This insurgency resulted in the deaths of several 
people, and about 100,000 others abandoned their homes. The KPC and the Albanian 
government assisted the NLA by allowing the entrance into FYROM of many mujahedin. 
It is estimated that about 150 of these fighters, who came from countries such as 
Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, joined the NLA. The NLA has 
also incorporated various other ethnic Albanian guerrillas and guerrilla groups (e.g., the 
Unikom) that have been fighting in Western FYROM during the 1990s.179  
The NLA declared that its aim was to “retain FYROM’s unified state status, but 
with a new constitution and international mediation over ethnic Albanian grievances.”180 
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Several scholars, however, believe that the NLA’s real aim is to create a “Greater 
Albania,” which would include territory that is currently in Albania, FYROM, Greece, 
Kosovo, and southern Serbia.181 The 2001 insurgency was concluded with a ceasefire, 
and according to its framework the NATO-led multinational force in FYROM was 
supposed to collect all the weapons from Islamic separatists. Even though around 3,000 
guns were confiscated, some weapons remained in the hands of the NLA fighters or were 
handed over to other terrorist organizations.182 
The ANA was founded at the end of 1999 by former leaders and members of the 
KLA in order to continue the insurgency in northern FYROM on behalf of the rights of 
the ethnic Albanians residing in the region. Initially, the name of the organization was the 
National Committee for the Liberation of Occupied Territories (NCLOT). It is affiliated 
with a political movement called the Front for National Unity of Albanians (FNUA), 
which emerged in July 2002. The FNUA has an organizational structure that includes 
political, military (the ANA), intelligence, and financial departments. The FNUA was 
founded by members of a radical Albanian political party named the Revolutionary Party 
of Albanians of Tirana.183 
The ANA is organized in the form of divisions that are responsible for specific 
geographical areas such as Kosovo and southern Serbia, Western FYROM, Montenegro, 
and southern Albania and Greece. The division that is active in FYROM is called the 
“Skenderbeu.” The ANA became the most significant actor in the separatist insurgency 
after the ceasefire was signed in FYROM following the 2001 conflict. Many of the 
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commanders of the Albanian army joined the organization as well. The overall number of 
fighters in the ranks of the ANA is estimated to be around two to three thousand 
people.184  
Western security agencies and United Nations reports confirm that the ANA is 
involved in illegal activities such as weapons smuggling and human and drug trafficking.  
With regard to narcotics, FYROM is one of the linking countries constituting the Balkan 
Drug Route. Drugs coming from Afghanistan are transferred through Turkey, Bulgaria, 
FYROM, Albania, and Italy to western markets. Money earned from these transactions is 
used to fund terrorist actions in FYROM and Kosovo.185  
In 2002, the ANA and other smaller terrorist organizations active in FYROM 
(e.g., the Real Albanian National Liberation Army) declared their intention to continue 
fighting against the national authorities until the latter introduce constitutional 
amendments in favor of the Albanian minority. The ANA has claimed responsibility for 
several attacks against FYROM’s security forces, such as the murder of three policemen 
on 12 November 2001.186 
Besides the terrorist organizations’ activities, a factor that significantly 
contributes to Islamic extremism in FYROM is the growing influence of Wahhabism. 
Following Yugoslavia’s dissolution and FYROM’s independence the first Wahhabis 
started moving into the country. A considerable instability in the ranks of the official 
Islamic Community (IVZ) allowed rich Saudi Arabs and people from other Islamic states 
to subsidize the radical movement through charities and unreported payments. The IVZ 
initially found itself in turmoil because a Muslim from FYROM, Jakup Selimovski, and  
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an Albanian, Rexhep Sulejmani, challenged each other for the community’s leadership. 
Finally, they and their supporting factions came to an agreement under unknown 
circumstances and joined forces.187 
In the late 1990s, a man regarded as highly corrupt, Zenun Berisha, became the 
Skopje Chief Mufti. This caused even more instability in the IVZ and opened the road to 
the rise of the Wahhabi movement. Berisha’s leadership left the IVZ exposed to the 
influence of outside radicals, and he participated in several economic scandals. In 2004, 
his practices were discovered and became known to most of the moderate imams, who 
consequently removed him from office. Berisha, however, had already established a 
strong Wahhabi network by infiltrating fundamentalist religious preachers or bureaucratic 
officials in every mosque in the capital of the country.188 He had also developed a strong 
faction consisting of Albanian outlaws and Islamic extremists, which used violence in 
order to enforce his will. In an incident in the summer of 2005, his loyal Wahhabi group 
attacked a car carrying Tazhedin Beslimi, the new Skopje chief mufti, who was openly 
against the Wahhabis. Even though Beslimi’s election contributed to the stabilization of 
the IVZ, the Wahhabi network seems to be so strongly established that it is difficult to 
remove. Moreover, experts believe that the rivalry between moderate Muslims and 
Wahhabis will increase in the future.189 
Recruitment by the Wahhabis is usually conducted in rural mountainous areas 
where uneducated and narrow-minded people reside. Those who embrace the doctrine 
grow long beards and compel their wives and daughters to wear Islamic dress. Some of 
them travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan for 3 to 4 months while their families stay 
behind and live a comfortable life without any visible means of support. Local residents 
claim that their numbers have increased in the last few years, mainly because once a 
person becomes a Wahhabi traditionally his family has to convert as well.190 Moreover, 
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the FYROM border police have discovered hidden camps in mountain areas where access 
is difficult. Besides indoctrinating young people, at least one of these camps has been 
identified as a physical training centre.191 In urban areas, recruiters try to convince people 
to convert to Wahhabism by glorifying the life of the mujahedin, “saying that everyone 
who fights in the name of Allah and dies will become a shahid (martyr) and go to 
paradise, where he will enjoy all the pleasures that he couldn’t have in this life.”192  
In recent years, FYROM’s authorities have introduced new legislation in order to 
strengthen the existing legal framework for the prevention of—and the fight against—
terrorism. The main legislative tool against terrorism is the Criminal Code, which 
addresses the following offenses: terrorism, association for enemy activity, preparation of 
terrorist acts, terrorist organization, and international terrorism (Articles 313, 324, 326, 
327 394-a, and 419 respectively). The Criminal Code foresees a prison sentence of 4 to 
15 years for terrorist actions, depending on their severity, and imprisonment for life for 
the most egregious ones.193  
In 2003, constitutional amendments, and in 2004, the Law on Amendments and 
Addenda to the Law on Criminal Procedure, introduced special investigative measures. 
These measures can be applied in cases in which the collection of evidence in any other 
way is difficult. These measures include monitoring communications, entering and 
searching computer systems, secret surveillance, monitoring, and audio-visual recording 
of persons.194 With regard to the prevention of the financing of terrorism the government 
has adopted the 2004 Law for Prevention of Money Laundering and Other Gains from 
Criminal Acts, and the 2005 National Strategy on the Fight against Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism.195 
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In parallel with the newly introduced legislation, FYROM’s government has 
developed an institutional framework for the efficient implementation of the relevant 
laws. In June 2002, the Interministerial Coordinative Body was created with the aim to 
coordinate the activities of special organs within the Ministries of Interior, Defense, and 
Finance (Directorate for Security and Counter-intelligence and Special Forces within the 
Ministry of Interior; Military Service for Security and Inquisition within the Ministry of 
Defense; Directorate for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financial Police 
within the Ministry of Finance). Moreover, the Public Prosecutor’s Office has been 
established as a state organ in order to prosecute acts of terrorism and criminal acts 
related to terrorism, which are offenses no longer examined by the national courts.196 
C. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN FYROM 
Religious education has a long history in FYROM, and it is mostly connected 
with the activities of the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC). The MOC has a history 
of nearly twelve centuries (beginning in 886 A.D.), and it is linked with the education of 
St. Clement and St. Naum of Ohrid. These saints offered religious and cultural education 
to Slav Macedonians for three decades. After their deaths, their activities were continued 
by others, and upon the creation of the autocephalous Ohrid Archbishopric several 
theological educational institutions functioned in the monasteries. During the Ottoman 
period, the Orthodox Christian religious and cultural-educational activities fell to a low 
level, but they were not completely halted.197 On the contrary, Ottoman Muslim culture 
flourished, and many architectural masterpieces, such as mosques, bridges, and guest 
houses (hans) are still in place as proofs of that era’s achievements.198 
After World War II, the People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was created, and the 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, located in the Vardar area, became one of its sovereign 
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states. The Yugoslav Constitution, along with the Constitution of the People's Republic 
of Macedonia, was adopted in 1946; and it provided regulations regarding religion and 
the relationship between the federal state and religious communities.  According to this 
Constitution, which guaranteed freedom of conscience and confession for the citizens, 
religious schools were under the general supervision of the state, and they were free to 
accept priests as teachers. The state could also provide material support to the religious 
communities. The 1953 Law on the Legal Status of the Religious Communities of 
Yugoslavia further elaborated on the above provisions.199 
In 1974 a new Constitution was adopted by the Assembly of the Socialist 
Republic of Macedonia. (The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution required that federal states 
regulate by law their relations with religious communities.) The new Constitution of the 
Socialist Republic of Macedonia provided that “religious communities can only form 
religious schools for the education of priests and that they can receive material support 
from the social community.” The 1977 Law on the Legal Status of the Religious 
Communities in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia provided that “education can be 
practiced in public rooms in which religious rituals and religious activities also occur.” It 
also provided that “religious instruction of minors cannot take place during school hours 
or when the children are engaged in other school activities.”200 
Until recently, the provisions for ecclesiastical law were determined by the 1991 
Constitution, which guaranteed freedom of religion, including public expression. 
Religious communities and groups are separated from the state and they have the right to 
establish their own religious schools and charitable institutions.201 The 1997 Law on 
Religious Communities and Religious Groups further elaborated on the status of religious 
education and schools. According to Article 8, a religious community is defined as a 
“voluntary organized non-profit community of adherents of the same denomination.” 
Article 9 defines a religious group as a “voluntary non-profit organization of believers of 
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the same religious faith, who do not belong to any registered religious community.” 
According to the 1997 Law, only one religious community from every faith was allowed 
to be registered in order to represent its believers.202 
In 1998, the Law was amended by the Constitutional Court, because several 
articles were unconstitutional. For example, the establishment of private schools, 
including ones with a religious orientation, was restricted; and parents were prohibited 
from homeschooling their children. Moreover, the activities of foreign preachers and 
missionaries were restricted, while foreigners in general were not allowed to conduct 
religious services without permission, or to provide religious instruction for children 
under the age of 10 without the permission of their parents.203 
Until recently, requests for permission to establish a place of worship were either 
ignored or denied. Mosques were often built without permission, but the government did 
not act against the Muslim communities. Eventually, a new law emerged with the 
assistance of the OSCE,204 and this law became effective on 1 May 2008.205 The new law 
removed restrictions on licensing places of worship and allowed religious education in 
such facilities. Currently there are 470 such places of worship for Muslims, although 
some of them are still under construction.206  
Even though religious communities are supposed to provide for their needs from 
their own incomes, they can be funded by the state under various circumstances. For 
example, the government has decided to fund the reconstruction of a mosque in the city 
of Tetovo, which has already commenced. Ministers of faith who come from abroad must 
apply to a State Commission in order to receive a visa, and they must also provide an 
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official invitation from a religious organization.207 Furthermore, religious education for 
all faiths is optional in the public schools, and it is initiated in the sixth year of primary 
school. Religious schools can also be established, with the exception of primary 
education.208  
Despite the fact that the Law on Education amendments of April 2007 states 
clearly that religious instruction is not mandatory,209 the government of FYROM and the 
Ministry of Education and Science enforced religious instruction in primary education in 
the 2008/2009 school year. According to this regulation, parents had to choose between 
two optional subjects—religious instruction or familiarization with religions—for their 
children to be taught. Religious teachers were offered a one-day training and application 
period, and the relevant textbooks were not provided on time, resulting in a delay in the 
start of classes. The government’s decision was criticized by human rights organizations 
because it is contrary to all relevant domestic and international regulations.210 As a result, 
the Constitutional Court of FYROM abolished Article 26 of the Law on Elementary 
Education (adopted in 2008), according to which “religious instruction can be studied in 
the primary schools as a subject of personal choice.”211 
In the post-communist period, the wearing of religious symbols has re-emerged in 
FYROM’s society, and has been manifest in the wearing of the cross or crucifix by 
Christians and of the crescent by Muslims. This is also the case with the dress code for 
students that appeared in 1992. In FYROM, under 3 percent of female students wear 
Islamic dress.212 Even though there is no law that forbids the wearing of religious 
symbols in schools, early in 2009 a high-school principal in Tetovo expelled a female 
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student for wearing a headscarf in the classroom according to the school regulations 
approved by parents. The principal was initially suspended from his duties by Tetovo’s 
mayor and later on reinstated by the State’s Education Inspectorate. The latter, even 
though it recognized that there are no laws prohibiting wearing religious marks in 
schools, stated that “since the pupils in that particular school are from different ethnicities 
and religious denominations, the headmaster thought that such an overt display of faith 
would harm the cohesion of the school, so he acted according to the statute that the 
parents themselves approved.”213 
The Islamic Community, one of the registered religious communities, has 
established several secondary schools (madrassas), most famously the “Isa Beg,” which 
provides religious, as well as secular instruction. Thus, Muslim students are able to 
continue their studies in universities other than the Faculty of Islam, which is an 
institution for higher education founded by the Islamic community. This institution was 
established in 1997/1998, and it can provide secondary school graduates with bachelor’s 
degrees. Prior to the foundation of the Islamic faculty, approximately 50 students had to 
continue their studies in Islamic countries, mainly in the Middle East. Because of the lack 
of reliable records, the exact percentage of Muslim children who receive a religious 
education can not be estimated.214 
The new law was intended to improve the legal status of religious communities, 
since it has relaxed the process of their registration. Currently there are four Muslim 
communities in FYROM, namely: (1) the Islamic Community, which is registered by the 
government and unites mainly the ethnic Albanians; (2) the Islamic Dervish Religious 
Community, which is also registered by the government and unites mainly the Roma; (3) 
the Muslim Religious Community, which is not registered, and which unites the ethnic 
Turks, the Torbeshi, the ethnic Bosnians and some Roma; and (4) the Bektashi 
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Community, which is also not registered and is dominated by ethnic Albanians.215 
Several problems have arisen with regard to the restitution of the religious properties that 
were expropriated by the former Yugoslav government. Discussions are under way 
between religious communities and the government over the issue. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Despite some indicators, such as attendance at weekly Christian services, religion 
in the twenty-first century is not completely in decline in Europe. Indeed, religion has a 
renewed importance, notably among Muslims in Europe, at the private level as well as at 
the national and international levels. Increased religious diversity, misunderstandings 
about other peoples’ faiths, and the creation of negative stereotypes have led to a 
heightened antagonism, which sometimes is expressed through religious extremism and 
violence. At the same time religious education teachers consider it imperative that young 
people know about multiple religions, since lack of knowledge promotes prejudice.216 In 
this sense, several European institutions have made efforts to foster education about 
religions and beliefs in order to facilitate dialogue and understanding among people of 
different faiths. 
A. EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
This thesis examines the roles of the European Union, the Council of Europe, and 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe with regard to religious 
education. 
1. European Union (EU) 
According to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the EU 
recognises the right of people to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
includes the right to manifest religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance (Article 10). Article 14, which is related to education, guarantees (among 
other freedoms) the freedom to found educational establishments with due respect for the 
right of parents to ensure the education and teaching of their children in conformity with 
their religious, philosophical and pedagogical convictions, in accordance with the  
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national laws governing the exercise of such freedoms and rights. Furthermore, the 
members of the EU are committed to respecting cultural, religious and linguistic diversity 
(Article 22).217 
Even though freedoms with regard to religion are guaranteed, the EU still remains 
a secular body with no advocacy of any specific religions in any of its fundamental policy 
documents. However, the EU acknowledges the significance of the religious dimension 
of intercultural dialogue and accordingly organized several related events in the 
framework of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008 (EYID).218 Among these 
activities was a seminar held in May 2008 entitled “The Visibility of Religion in the 
European Public Space: the Question of Worship Places and Religious Symbols in 
Clothing.” Members of multiple European institutions, NGOs and representatives of the 
religious communities and the academic world discussed religious pluralism in European 
societies and the role of religious symbols in the public space. Many participants argued 
that the language used by religious communities is not comprehensive enough to explain 
the value of symbols and the contribution of religion in general to the coherence of 
society. Moreover, with regard to the sensitive issue of mosque building, it was suggested 
that new architectural approaches that respect environmental standards and create spaces 
available for all people regardless of conviction constitute a positive measure against 
intolerance.219   
In 1995, the Council of the EU adopted a resolution on the Response of 
Educational Systems to the Problem of Racism. According to this resolution, European 
Union members should improve their educational systems in order to promote respect for 
people of all cultural origins. Educational systems should also encourage attitudes of 
solidarity and tolerance, and promote democratic values and human rights. The measures 
proposed included the use of educational materials that highlight cultural, ethnic and 
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religious diversity and that provide a better understanding of the nature of a multicultural 
society.  Moreover, students who are susceptible to racist or xenophobic influences 
should participate in integration initiatives, such as cooperation among schools.220 
The EU has launched the Framework 6 Program entitled “Citizens and 
Governance in a Knowledge Based Society,” which sponsors research projects 
concerning forms of teaching about religions that encourage dialogue and prevent 
conflict.221 One of these initiatives is the three year (March 2006-March 2009) REDCo 
Project: “Religion in Education: Contribution to Dialogue or a Factor of Conflict in 
Transforming Societies of European Countries?” Eight entities, namely, England, 
Estonia, France, Germany, Norway, Russia, Spain, and The Netherlands, participated in 
this qualitative and quantitative research in which young people were questioned 
regarding their views on religion and religious diversity, as well as on classroom 
dialogue, interaction and teaching methods.222  
Among the most significant findings of the research were the following: students 
experience religious diversity in their social life and in their schools in particular; 
information about religion is provided mainly by the family, with the school serving only 
as a secondary source; children of migrants are more likely to consider religion important 
for their lives; and students believe that knowledge about other religions can contribute to 
peaceful coexistence.  
The REDCo researchers proposed that students experience religious education 
that encourages understanding and tolerance and that is adapted to their needs as they 
mature. Learning about religions should be incorporated in subjects other than religious 
education, such as history, literature, and science. Moreover, students of different faith 
backgrounds should be encouraged to pursue religious studies at university. With regard 
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to education professionals, it is important that they be well trained in order to be able to 
make students feel comfortable with their diversity. They should also be prepared to 
address a plurality of religious topics with the participation of students of all religious or 
non-religious backgrounds.223 
2. Council of Europe (CoE) 
The CoE is the leading European organization producing legislation with regard 
to human rights. Freedom of religion or belief is guaranteed by the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 9).224 Moreover, 
according to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 
member states shall take measures in the field of education in order to promote 
knowledge of the culture, history, language and religion of their national minorities and 
of the majority (Article 12).225 In 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE adopted 
Recommendation 1720 on Religion and Education, which declared “that the Committee 
of Ministers [should] encourage the governments of member States to ensure that 
religious studies are taught at the primary and secondary levels of state education.”226 
In 2002, the CoE’s Steering Committee for Education (CDED) launched the 
initiative named “The New Challenge of Intercultural Education: Religious Diversity and 
Dialogue in Europe.” The working groups that participated in this project acknowledged 
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share their experiences with each other, they can benefit from ideas already implemented 
in practice by other member states, and with this information they can review their 
current policies.227 
The discussions and findings of three working groups were incorporated in a book 
published by the CoE entitled The Religious Dimension of Intercultural Education. The 
book argued, among other things, that a distinction should be drawn “between the 
religious dimension of intercultural education, on the one hand, and the intercultural 
dimension of religious education on the other.” However, both of these approaches share 
the same value basis, that is, respect for human rights.228  
Many of the participants recognised that knowledge about religion is essential in 
understanding human beings and their cultures, and that the religious dimension can not 
only be incorporated in religious education, but in other subjects as well.229 It was also 
said that countries do not have the same needs with regard to education as a result of their 
different historical experiences. For example, several states, most of which are former 
communist countries, do not offer a religious education curriculum, while in other states 
religious education is a subject per se. It was thus suggested that different strategies for 
different countries should be investigated. Several other issues, such as the improvement 
of textbooks and teachers’ education, were discussed.230 
Following the several discussions, a committee of religious and intercultural 
education experts appointed by the CDED cooperated to write a guiding document for 
teachers, teacher trainers and policy makers. This resulted in the publication of a 
document entitled Religious Diversity and Intercultural Education: a Reference Book for 
Schools.231 One of the key concepts of the book was that transmission of religious and 
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moral values can not be achieved just by incorporating them in a curriculum. This is a 
long lasting procedure and students should develop such values gradually at a personal 
level in order for them to have a lasting effect. Moreover, education on religious values 
should be in accord with human rights, democracy and the rule of law.232  
The Reference Book for Schools suggests that states should create concrete 
relations with religious communities, some of which have played an important role in 
shaping the social, moral and political life of their countries. Moreover, educational 
models should avoid stereotyping and at the same time allow for religious differences to 
be openly expressed and understood. Accordingly, teaching materials should not contain 
stereotypes with regard to religions and non-religious convictions. The education about 
religion can be included in several school subjects such as citizenship education, social 
studies, and religious education per se. In order to promote intercultural dialogue and 
understanding, governments should consider organizing “exchange programs” between 
schools with an homogenous student population and schools whose student population is 
heterogeneous. Governments should also consider decentralizing their educational 
systems. Local school leaders are more familiar with their students’ cultural background 
than are national-level leaders. As a result, it is easier for local leaders to define their role 
with regard to religious diversity.233 
Another important success of the CoE in the field of intercultural dialogue is the 
publication of the “White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue.” Regarding the religious 
dimension of intercultural dialogue the paper attempts to promote a dialogue between 
religious communities and public authorities as a means of peacebuilding. It also suggests 
that religious communities interact with each other, through interreligious dialogue, in 
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also acknowledged that the issue of religious symbols is a sensitive one and that there is a 
lack of consensus among the member states. As a result, the states are allowed 
considerable discretion on this issue.234 
3. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
In 2006, the OSCE adopted the Decision on Combating Intolerance and Non-
Discrimination and Promoting Mutual Respect and Understanding. The OSCE 
Ministerial Council encouraged the member states to “address the root causes of 
intolerance and discrimination by encouraging the development of comprehensive 
domestic education policies and strategies,” and to “promote a greater understanding of 
and respect for different cultures, ethnicities, religions or beliefs.”235 Consequently, the 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) invited several scholars, 
teachers, policy makers, lawyers, and members of inter-governmental and non-
governmental organizations to develop a manual with recommendations for teaching 
about religions and beliefs. Their effort resulted in the publication of the Toledo Guiding 
Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools.236 
The primary purpose of this manual is to offer assistance to OSCE member states 
that want to include the study of religions and beliefs in their educational curricula. In 
order to ensure freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the Toledo Guiding 
Principles establish a framework of human rights and legal issues with regard to the 
proper implementation of curricula for teaching about religions and beliefs. Accordingly, 
the Toledo Guiding Principles take into account the rights of parents, children, religious 
communities and minorities.237  
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The Toledo Guiding Principles also provide several recommendations on the 
development of a high-quality curriculum. Educational curricula should be inclusive and 
sensitive to contemporary historical developments that affect religion and belief issues. 
They should also be flexible regarding different local exercises of religious practices 
found in schools. Three different approaches to religious and beliefs education are 
suggested: the subject-specific approach, according to which some aspects of religious 
education can be incorporated into art, literature, music, history and philosophy in order 
to strengthen understanding; the integrated approach, which implies that elements of 
religious education can be integrated into intercultural education or education for 
democratic citizenship; and the cross-curricular approach, according to which religious 
education aspects could be projected through cross-curricular lessons and activities. They 
could, for example, be associated with human rights education and education about 
mutual respect and understanding.238  
The Toledo Guiding Principles present also two pedagogical approaches. The first 
one, the teacher-centred approach, implies that the teacher is the main actor in the 
educational procedure, since he is the main source of information for the students. This 
requires the availability of quality teaching materials, and it is of critical importance that 
the teacher be well-educated in his field of knowledge. The second approach is the 
student-centred pedagogy, according to which the teacher should be able to properly 
provide a platform for students to interact with each other. This includes dialogue, debate, 
research projects (performed in groups when possible), drama and presentations. Students 
should also be allowed to openly express their own values and beliefs.239 
Several teachers interviewed in the framework of this OSCE project admitted that 
they are not properly prepared to deal with the increasing religious diversity they face in 
their classrooms. Under these circumstances, the Toledo Guiding Principles discuss the 
sensitive issue of teacher training and offer some suggestions. The manual places 
particular emphasis on pre-service and in-service teacher education. This requires that 
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OSCE member states investigate whether their teacher-training institutions, such as 
colleges and universities, provide a quality education to future teachers, in order for them 
to be able to address the religious diversity that they will encounter at schools. Given the 
fact that developments, with regard to religion, take place at a fast pace, it is essential that 
teachers always be up to date with them. It is suggested that teacher-training facilities can 
assess the materials proposed by intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations 
with experience in the field and adopt some of these materials in order to be able to 
provide further training on religious education.240 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FOUR COUNTRIES CONSIDERED 
IN THE CASE STUDIES 
The intersection of agents of radical Islamic extremism with young marginalized 
Muslims could become an explosive mixture in the two western European cases 
examined in this thesis: Britain and France. Anti-Westernism, along with a perceived 
absence of binding links with their countries of origin, leads Muslim youths to search for 
a cultural and religious identity, and they occasionally find their personal answer in neo-
fundamentalism. Moreover, the source of this ideology is most readily available in the 
institutions that correspond to their religious practices, namely the mosques. A 
comparison of the two case studies shows that France has done less than Britain to 
accommodate Muslim religious practices and education. However, the policies of both 
countries seem to be inadequate to deal with the problems of Muslim radicalization and 
terrorist recruitment.  
The Balkan states under examination are considered potential havens for terrorist 
networks because of the presence of significant Muslim populations and their 
geographical proximity to Islamic countries that have already experienced Islamic 
extremist actions. Both countries—Albania and FYROM—recently revised their laws 
concerning religious freedom, but these laws still do not provide enough support for the 
religious education of Muslims. This thesis suggests that taking bold measures to support 
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the religious education of Muslims could prevent—or at least limit—access to radical 
ideas and promote support for more moderate forms of Islam. 
Government schools in the United Kingdom, as mentioned previously, have 
included civic integration classes. This is consistent with the integrated approach 
suggested by the Toledo Guiding Principles, according to which religious education 
elements can be incorporated into civic education courses. It is also a valuable first step 
in promoting understanding of diversity in identities between people of different origins 
and faiths, and it may help to break down the cultural divide between Muslims and the 
rest of British society.  
However, the Education Reform Act of 1988 (confirmed by the Education Acts of 
1996 and 1998) clearly states that religious education must be provided for all registered 
students in government-maintained schools.  Currently only a few schools fail to meet 
this requirement, but the standards on the provision of religious education are only at an 
average level. This is probably because several Local Education Authorities (LEA) can 
not provide effective curriculum planning and assessment.241 In regard to these issues, 
the British Ministry of Education should provide the means (religious education teachers 
and materials) in order for the remaining schools to incorporate a religious education 
curriculum. At the same time, the LEA should reevaluate their assessment strategies in 
order to be able to effectively measure the impact of religious education on students, 
perhaps through polling of a sample of the students. Consequently, they will be able to 
introduce the proper changes in the locally agreed syllabuses, thus improving the 
provision of religious education. 
It has been reported that religious education has been taught by non-specialists in 
Britain. Moreover, there are not enough religious education teachers in Britain to cover 
the needed positions in secondary schools.242 British authorities should take into account 
the Toledo Guiding Principles with regard to pre-service and in-service teaching 
education. The Ministry of Education should establish more religious education teaching 
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programs (e.g., at colleges and universities) and re-evaluate the quality of teacher-training 
in existing programs. Moreover, as the REDCo proposed, students of different faith 
backgrounds should be encouraged to pursue religious studies at university, so that they 
can effectively meet the requirement for religious education teachers. 
As mentioned above, in France and Albania government religious education is not 
allowed at all. In 2001, however, the French Minister of Education at that time, Jack 
Lang, invited Régis Debray to make an assessment of the current situation with regard to 
the potential provision of religious education and provide recommendations as to how to 
alter the situation. Debray suggested that teaching about religions could be incorporated 
in other subjects, such as history and philosophy. He further proposed the establishment 
of an institute of “sciences of religion” able to provide initial and in-service education to 
religious education teachers. This latter recommendation became a reality with the 
foundation of the European Institute of Religious Science in 2002. This institution is 
currently preparing relevant courses for teachers.243  
Debray’s recommendations are consistent with those of the EU, the CoE, and the 
OSCE. This thesis suggests that the French Ministry of Education continue these 
initiatives, and at the same time take into account the rest of the recommendations 
reviewed above in order to effectively incorporate religious education in a subject-
specific approach.   
The Albanian government might find it consistent with the national interest to re-
examine its decision not to provide any religious education. Since Albania is a member 
state of the CoE, it should respect the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, according to which states shall take measures in the field of 
education in order to promote knowledge of the culture, history, language and religion of 
their national minorities and of the majority. Albania is also a participating state in the 
OSCE and aspires to EU membership. Incorporating teaching about religions in its 
educational system could potentially be considered a positive step towards meeting the 
necessary standards for membership in the EU. The general principles on how to 
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establish an effective religious education curriculum already exist. The Albanian Ministry 
of Education could create a special committee to examine which of these 
recommendations could positively serve its educational system in light of Albanian 
historical experiences. 
In FYROM, religious instruction is optional, while the country’s biggest religious 
communities, both Orthodox and Muslims, have agreed to include units on other faiths in 
religion classes and to promote religious tolerance. It has already become a tradition to 
exchange teachers between the Orthodox theological faculty and the Islamic faculty, with 
students showing a great interest in lectures about the other faith. This fact suggests that 
offering religion classes that would teach the principles of other faiths, including Islam, 
could be a bold step in providing an identity to young Muslims receptive to a moderate 
form of Islam. Since religious education is a subject per se (even though optional) in 
FYROM’s educational system, the Ministry of Education could further improve teaching 
about religions by providing higher quality pre-service and in-service instruction to 
religious education teachers. 
Concerning the public funding of Islamic schools, there had been considerable 
obstacles in the United Kingdom in the past. Catholic, Anglican and Jewish schools were 
supported financially, while Islamic schools were not. Since 1997, however, the 
government has provided funds for religious public schools of all faiths. Today 98 
Islamic schools are functioning in the United Kingdom. It is estimated that 100,000 
children between the ages of 5 and 14 attend the madrassas, and they typically attend for 
two hours after school each day.244  
In France, in contrast, even though state funding of supplementary schools is 
provided, the preliminary conditions in order for these funds to be granted are virtually 
impossible to fulfill. Some observers argue that France’s policy should be changed to 
provide economic support with much more moderate criteria than the existing conditions. 
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In Albania, the public funding of religious schools is prohibited. As a result, most 
Islamic schools function at a sub-optimal level, while young Muslims who wish to pursue 
an undergraduate education study abroad. The Albanian government might find it 
advantageous to consider changing the strict secular provisions concerning public 
funding of religious schools. 
In FYROM, religious communities are allowed by law to be funded by the state in 
special circumstances. Islamic educational institutions have been functioning much more 
effectively in FYROM than in Albania, so the Skopje government might well choose to 
support them financially and cooperate with the communities in order to have influence 
in creating a curriculum that would promote religious tolerance.  
All four of the countries examined in this thesis, besides funding religious 
instruction in public schools, might also consider establishing special committees with 
the objective of assessing the quality of the provision of religious education. 
Governments might also encourage teachers of religions and beliefs to participate in pre-
service and in-service teacher-training programs. 
The building of mosques in the United Kingdom has not been a matter of 
controversy, in contrast with the French case. Local opposition has been a serious 
obstacle to mosque construction in France. The French authorities could work in a more 
productive way on this issue in consultation with the existing Muslim councils, including 
the French Council for the Muslim Religion (CFCM) and other regional Muslim 
representatives.  
In both the Balkan cases, the building or reconstruction of mosques is currently 
allowed. However, in Albania the absence of public funding of places of worship has 
resulted in foreign Islamic organizations taking control. In both Albania and FYROM, the 
government would be well-advised to consider promoting the restitution of religious 
properties in order to help the religious communities build their churches and mosques 
without external intervention.  
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All four of the countries examined in this thesis could find it advantageous to 
investigate the possibility of building mosques with spaces available for non-Muslims in 
order to promote tolerance, as suggested in a seminar conducted under the auspices of the 
EU.245 
In both the British and French cases, the clerics who run the mosques are often 
foreigners with little or no knowledge of the local languages and without any familiarity 
with the indigenous societies. Founding institutions for educating religious preachers and 
teachers (both in government and religious schools) may be the proper solution to avoid 
dependence on foreigners who may have been educated with fundamentalist or even 
extremist principles of Islam. Governmental authorities could find it beneficial to consult 
with official Muslim associations or even with the authorities of the countries that their 
Muslim immigrants have come from, in order to determine what the educational 
requirements would be for a moderate imam or teacher. The imams and teachers would 
preferably be born and educated in Europe so that they will have a greater affiliation with 
European societies.  
As noted above, in Albania, Muslim students who want to pursue a higher 
religious education end up studying abroad. The Albanian government might therefore 
consider assisting the Islamic community in founding an Islamic university. The fact that 
an Islamic faculty already exists in FYROM has discouraged an influx of foreign 
preachers and teachers in mosques and schools. 
Given the prospect that the two Balkan States under consideration in this thesis—
Albania and FYROM—might become members of the European Union, the issue of 
religious education has international as well as national implications. The development of 
a common anti-terrorist strategy, including preventive measures such as moderate 
religious education, should be seriously considered in the framework of the European 
Union’s policies. The EU’s current initiatives are still at a research rather than an 
implementation level. In contrast, the CoE has always been more sensitive to issues  
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regarding human rights and education. An adoption of the CoE’s principles in the EU’s 
decision making would be a positive step in producing legislation relevant to preventing 
Islamic extremism.   
All the possible measures discussed above are meant to prevent the circulation of 
radical ideas and to promote support for moderate forms of Islam that do not include 
violence as a means of expressing Muslim identity. Such measures could be a significant 
part of the set of policies required to prevent and counter terrorism. 
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